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ADVANCING TRIBAL COURT
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN
ALASKA
RYAN FORTSON*
ABSTRACT
Extensive case law already exists in Alaska on the jurisdiction of tribal courts
over domestic relations cases, with one of the seminal cases—John v.
Baker—establishing that Alaska tribes have jurisdiction even in the absence
of Indian country. A common assumption, though, is that Alaska tribes do
not have jurisdiction over criminal offenses. This Article argues that both
under the logic of John v. Baker and the development of Indian law in the
Lower 48, Alaska tribes already possess inherent jurisdiction over criminal
offenses within their Native villages. With the gamut of social challenges
facing Alaska Natives in rural Alaska, tribes need to be empowered to exercise
this jurisdiction.

INTRODUCTION
There is a deficit of justice in rural Alaska. For thousands of years,
Alaska’s tribes had a functioning dispute resolution system. But with
Western contact and incorporation into the State of Alaska, Alaska
Natives have been forced to participate in law enforcement and court
systems that are both geographically and culturally remote. Today, rural
Alaska faces tremendous challenges addressing its epidemic of violence
fueled by drug use and alcohol abuse. The best hope Native
communities in rural Alaska have to combat this epidemic is the revival
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of their tribal courts and traditions and the recognition of their ability to
be valued participants combating these challenges, including the ability
to adjudicate criminal offenses. Tribal court criminal jurisdiction is
legally justified and absolutely necessary for the survival of rural Native
communities.
A.

The Staggering Statistics on Crime and Substance Abuse in Rural
Alaska

Alaska Native women face disproportionately high rates of
domestic violence. Statewide, 58.6% of women in Alaska will experience
intimate-partner violence or sexual violence sometime during their
lifetime and 11.8% of women in Alaska experience gender-based
violence in any given year.1 One study found that Alaska Natives
comprised 47.2% of the statewide victims of domestic violence (most of
these victims were women),2 even though Alaska Natives only
comprised 17.7% of the statewide population.3 With regard to sexual
1. Council on Domestic Violence & Sexual Assault, Intimate Partner Violence
and Sexual Violence in the State of Alaska: Key Results from the 2010 Alaska
Victimization Survey, UAA JUST. CENTER 2 (2010), http://justice.uaa.alaska.
edu/research/2010/1004.avs_2010/1004.07a.statewide_summary.pdf. Of these
women, 47.6% will experience intimate partner violence and 37.1% will
experience sexual violence. Id. The study did not distinguish the race of the
victim. These results are roughly consistent with more focused studies on
different parts of the state: 50.8% of women in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta
region and 51.7% in the Bristol Bay region reported being a victim of intimate
partner violence or sexual violence during their lifetime. Council on Domestic
Violence & Sexual Assault, Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence in the
Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta: Key Results from the 2012 Alaska Victimization Survey,
UAA JUST. CENTER 2 (2012), http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/
1103.02.avs_fy12/1103.023a.yk_summary.pdf; Council on Domestic Violence &
Sexual Assault, Intimate Partner Violence and Sexual Violence in Bristol Bay: Key
Results from the 2011 Alaska Victimization Survey, UAA JUST. CENTER 2 (2011),
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2010/1103.01.avs_fy11/1103.013a.bristol
bay_summary.pdf. Nationally, American Indians experience rape and sexual
assault at over twice the rate of all other races combined. Steven W. Perry, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, American Indians and Crime: A BJS Statistical Profile 1992-2002,
BUREAU JUST. STAT. 5 (2004), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/aic02.pdf.
2. Marny Rivera et al., Alaska State Troopers Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Alaska
Dep’t of Law, Descriptive Analysis of Assaults in Domestic Violence Incidents
Reported to Alaska State Troopers: 2004, UAA JUST. CENTER 37 (2008),
http://justice.uaa.alaska.edu/research/2000/0601.intimatepartnerviolence/060
1.04.dv-assaults.pdf. Seventy percent of the victim reports were from women. Id.
This report reflects only assaults in domestic violence incidents that were
reported to the Alaska State Troopers. Id. at 6. Domestic violence incidents
reported to municipal police agencies such as the Anchorage Police Department
were excluded from the study. Id. at 10. However, this is likely to make the
report more reflective of experiences in rural Alaska.
3. ALASKA BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 215 (2005),
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assaults, including sexual assaults of a minor, 60.5% of the victims are
Alaska Native.4 An Alaska Native woman is sexually assaulted every 18
hours, and Alaska Native women suffer the highest rate of rape in the
nation.5 A study focused on Athabaskan women living in the Interior of
Alaska found that 63.7% of them had experienced interpersonal violence
sometime in their life, and 18.7% were threatened with a gun.6 Alaska
Natives are 2.5 times more likely to be killed in a homicide than white
Alaskans.7 Another study showed that 36.7% of Alaska Natives report
being hit, slapped, punched, shoved, kicked, choked, or otherwise
physically hurt by a spouse or partner; however, only 18.5% of nonNatives report similar abuse.8 These numbers rise to 46.5% and 22.6%,
respectively, for women.9 The vast majority of domestic violence
assaults against Alaska Natives (87.3%) are committed by other Alaska
Natives.10
As compared to non-Natives, Alaska Native children also suffer
greatly and disproportionately. Alaska Native women are more than
twice as likely as non-Natives to be physically abused by their partner in

available at http://dhss.alaska.gov/dph/VitalStats/Documents/PDFs/2005/
annual_report/2005_Annual_Report.pdf.
4. Greg Postle et al., Alaska State Troopers Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Alaska
Dep’t of Law, Descriptive Analysis of Assaults in Domestic Violence Incidents
Reported to Alaska State Troopers: 2003–2004, RESEARCHGATE 42 (2007),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228434218_Descriptive_analysis_of_
sexual_assault_incidents_reported_to_Alaska_State_Troopers_2003-2004.
5. Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2014, S. 1474, 113th Cong. §
2(a)(3) (as introduced in Senate, Aug. 1, 2013), available at
https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s1474/BILLS-113s1474is.pdf
(enacted
without relevant language as Repeal of Special Rule for State of Alaska, Pub. L.
No. 113-275, 128 Stat. 2988 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ275/pdf/PLAW113publ275.pdf).
6. Darryl S. Wood & Randy H. Magen, Intimate Partner Violence Against
Athabaskan Women Residing in Interior Alaska: Results of a Victimization Survey, 15
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 497, 501 (2009), available at vaw.sagepub.com/
content/15/4/497.long.
7. ALASKA NATIVE EPIDEMIOLOGY CTR. & ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL HEALTH
CONSORTIUM, ALASKA NATIVE HEALTH STATUS REPORT 38 (2009), available at
http://www.anthc.org/chs/epicenter/upload/ANHSR.pdf. The homicide rate
for Alaska Natives is 2.9 times higher than the national average. Id.
8. Melissa Kemberling & Laura Avellaneda-Cruz, Healthy Native Families:
Preventing Violence at All Ages, ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL HEALTH CONSORTIUM 29
(3d ed. 2013), available at http://www.anthctoday.org/epicenter/publications/
alaskanativefamilies/dvsaBulletin_3rd_ed_final.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Rivera et al., supra note 2, at 44. There is a similar correlation of whites
committing sexual assaults against other whites (86.6%). Id. The figures for
sexual assaults are even higher, with 91.3% of sexual assaults of Alaska Natives
being committed by other Alaska Natives. Postle et al., supra note 4, at 47.
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the months leading up to and during pregnancy.11 The percent of
mothers of three-year-olds who report that their children saw violence
or abuse in person was 9.4% for Alaska Natives compared to only 6.1%
for non-Natives.12 Among Alaska Natives, 31.1% report that as a child
they witnessed domestic violence against a parent or guardian.13 In the
month of October 2014 alone, there were 617 Alaska Native alleged
victims of child maltreatment screened by the Alaska Office of Children
Services (out of 1,298 total cases screened)14 and 141 substantiated cases
of child maltreatment against Alaska Native children (out of 237 total
substantiated cases).15 These figures are not an aberration—similar
statistics appear for other months.16 These numbers reveal that about
half of child abuse and child neglect victims are Alaska Natives, despite
the fact that that group constitutes a far lower percentage of the overall
population. It is not surprising, then, that in October 2014 again, 62.0%
of the children in out-of-home foster care placement were Alaska
Natives—1,464 out of 2,362.17
State courts are often difficult for rural Alaskans to access. There
are only thirteen cities with an Alaska Superior Court, with two other
cities having a District Court but not a Superior Court.18 A substantial
number of other locations have magistrate judges, but their jurisdiction

11. See Kemberling & Avellaneda-Cruz, supra note 8, at 28 (noting that in
2010, 8.6% of Alaska Native women were abused in the twelve months prior to
pregnancy, compared to 3.6% for non-Natives; 6.7% of Alaska Native women
were abused during their most recent pregnancy, compared to only 3.1% of nonNatives).
12. Id. at 28 (data is for 2010–11).
13. Id. at 29 (data is for 2009; only 17.2% of non-Natives reported witnessing
domestic violence as a child).
14. Alleged Victims by Age and Race for OSRs Screened in October 2014, ALASKA
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & SOC. SERVICES, OFF. CHILD.’S SERVICES (2014),
http://dhss.alaska.gov/ocs/Documents/statistics/pdf/201410_AllgVctmRaceA
ge.pdf.
15. Substantiated Victims by Age and Race for Initial Assessments Completed
During the Month of October 2014, ALASKA DEPARTMENT HEALTH & SOC. SERVICES,
OFF. CHILD.’S SERVICES (2014), http://dhss.alaska.gov/ocs/Documents/
statistics/pdf/201410_SbsVctmRaceAge.pdf.
16. See generally Statistical Information, ALASKA DEPARTMENT HEALTH & SOC.
SERVICES, OFF. CHILD.’S SERVICES, http://dhss.alaska.gov/ocs/Pages/statistics/
default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
17. All Children in Alaska OCS Out-of-Home Placement for the Month of October
2014 by Race, ALASKA DEPARTMENT HEALTH & SOC. SERVICES, OFF. CHILD.’S
SERVICES, http://dhss.alaska.gov/ocs/Documents/statistics/pdf/201410_Race.
pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2015). Less than half of these children were placed with
Alaska Native families. Id.
18. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2014, at 48–61, available at
http://courts.alaska.gov/reports/annualrep-fy14.pdf.
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is limited.19 Moreover, with most rural villages lacking road access to
major population centers, accessing even a magistrate, let alone a larger
court, can require substantial effort and resources.
Law enforcement in Alaska is a complicated web of varying
personnel. Unlike larger urban areas, few Alaska villages have their own
police force; instead, law enforcement is handled primarily by the
Alaska State Troopers.20 Of the 272 communities served by the Alaska
State Troopers, 64% are off the road system and accessible only by
airplane, boat, or snow machine.21 Troopers are required to cover service
areas that are many thousands of square miles and contain dozens of
communities.22 Responding to calls for service may take hours or even
days, especially when frequent bad weather hampers air travel to the
village from which the call initiated.23 These villages are small, typically
with only 250 to 300 residents, and “more closely resemble villages in
developing countries than small towns.”24

19. Id. at 9.
20. Rivera et al., supra note 2, at 14. Alaska does not have the system of
counties found in every other state. Alaska has boroughs, which to some extent
operate as the functional equivalent of counties, though these boroughs can
stretch over areas larger than many states. See generally DAN BOCKHORST, ALASKA
DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV., LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALASKA (2001), available at
http://commerce.alaska.gov/dnn/Portals/4/pub/Local_Gov_AK.pdf. Some,
but not all, boroughs have their own police force, with other boroughs leaving
municipalities to handle their own law enforcement. Rivera et al., supra note 2, at
14. Moreover, significant portions of Alaska (roughly half the state
geographically, but less than 14% of the population) are not part of an organized
borough and rely completely on the State for services. BOCKHORST, supra, at 2.
21. Rivera et al., supra note 2, at 12 (citing Alaska Advisory Comm. to the
U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights, Racism’s Frontier: The Untold Story of Discrimination
and Division in Alaska, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS KING CAREY SCH. L. 12 (Apr. 2002),
https://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/racisimsfrontier
.pdf.
22. Rivera et al., supra note 2, at 15–17. The Alaska State Troopers are
divided into five detachments; the largest geographic detachment, covering
Western Alaska, consists of forty-five Troopers providing primary law
enforcement for 40,000 residents spread across 125 communities over 267,000
square miles. Id. at 16; see also Darryl S. Wood et al., Police Presence, Isolation, and
Sexual Assault Prosecution, 22 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 330, 332 (2011) (observing
that for areas of primary jurisdiction for the Alaska State Troopers off the road
system there is a population density of one resident for every eight square
miles).
23. Wood et al., supra note 22.
24. Att’y Gen.’s Advisory Comm. on Am. Indian & Alaska Native Children
Exposed to Violence, Ending Violence So Children Can Thrive, U.S. DEPARTMENT
JUST. 131 (Nov. 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/defending
childhood/pages/attachments/2014/11/18/finalaianreport.pdf (citing and
quoting Indian Law and Order Comm’n, A Roadmap for Making Native America
Safer: Report to the President and Congress of the United States, UCLA AM. INDIAN
STUDS. CENTER ch. 2, at 38 (Nov. 2013), http://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/
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Law enforcement in rural Alaska is supplemented by Village Public
Safety Officers (VSPOs), who serve as first responders in communities
without Alaska State Troopers.25 As of August 2013, there were 101
VPSOs in 86 communities.26 VPSOs are funded by the State and trained
by Troopers, but are employed by regional nonprofit corporations.27
Until recently, VPSOs were not allowed to carry firearms.28 In addition
to the VPSOs, there were a total of 109 Village Police Officers and Tribal
Police Officers as of August 2011.29 The purpose of these supplemental
officers is not to replace Alaska State Troopers, but rather to serve as a
“trip wire” for calling in reports to the Alaska State Troopers.30
Furthermore, at least 75 Alaska villages have no on-site law-enforcement
presence.31 Yet despite this discrepancy between rural law
enforcement—VPSOs, Village Police Officers, and Tribal Police
officers—and more traditional police forces, there is nothing
unconstitutional about the arrangement, at least not under state law.32

[hereinafter ILOC Roadmap]).
25. Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, A Brief Look at VPSOs and
Violence Against Women Cases, 28 ALASKA JUST. F. 10, 10 (Summer/Fall 2011).
26. VPSO Ranks Grow to 101, STORIES IN THE NEWS (Aug. 10, 2013),
http://www.sitnews.us/0813News/081013/081013_vpso.html.
27. Darryl S. Wood, Officer Turnover in the Village Public Safety Officer
Program, 17 ALASKA JUST. F. 1, 4 (Summer 2000).
28. Following the shooting death of an unarmed VPSO in 2013, a bill was
introduced in the Alaska Legislature in 2014 to allow, but not require, VPSOs to
carry firearms. Carey Restino, Bill to Allow VPSOs to Carry Guns Advances to
Alaska Senate, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.
alaskadispatch.com/article/20140314/bill-allow-vpsos-carry-guns-advancesalaska-senate. The bill was signed into law on July 18, 2014. Pat Forgey, Alaska
VPSOs Get Official State Backing for Firearms Training and Use, ALASKA DISPATCH
NEWS (July 18, 2014), https://www.adn.com/article/20140718/alaska-vpsosget-official-state-backing-firearms-training-and-use. Two officers recently
became the first VPSOs to receive training and be certified to carry firearms.
Rachel Waldholz, First Two VPSOs Graduate from Firearm Training, KCAW (Apr.
3, 2015), http://www.kcaw.org/2015/04/03/first-two-vpsos-graduate-fromfirearm-training/.
29. Justice Ctr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage, supra note 25.
30. Wood et al., supra note 22, at 333.
31. Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act, A Bill to Amend the
Omnibus Indian Advancement Act to Modify the Date as of Which Certain Tribal Land
of the Lytton Rancheria of California Is Considered to Be Held in Trust and to Provide
for the Conduct of Certain Activities on the Land, and Alaska Safe Families and Villages
Act of 2011: Hearing on S. 1763, S. 872, and S. 1192 Before the S. Comm. On Indian
Affairs, 112th Cong. 55 (2011) (statement of Joe Masters, Comm’r, Alaska
Department of Public Safety).
32. See Alaska Inter-Tribal Council v. State, 110 P.3d 947, 967 (Alaska 2005).
(“The state cannot realistically post a trooper in every remote village, and indeed
plaintiffs conceded below that this is constitutionally unnecessary.”). This case
also gives an informative history of the VPSO and Village Police Officer
programs in Alaska. Id. at 951–53.
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The vast majority of crimes in rural Alaska that these officers are
required to deal with are fueled by alcohol or drugs. A staggering 97%
of crimes committed by Alaska Natives involve alcohol or drugs,
although that figure includes both urban and rural residents.33
Substance abuse, mainly alcohol abuse, is involved in 81% of all reports
of harm.34 Studies using Alaska State Trooper data show that in 57% of
domestic violence assaults and 43% of sexual assaults, the perpetrator
consumed alcohol prior to the assault; illicit drugs were used before 3%
and 7% of these crimes, respectively.35 The Alaska State Troopers
themselves have revealed that “[m]embers of Alaska’s law enforcement
community and others who are part of Alaska’s criminal justice system
have long known that the greatest contributing factor to violent crimes,
including domestic violence and sexual assault, is drug and alcohol
abuse.”36
But alcohol causes harm to the drinker as well as to his or her
potential victims. Alcohol abuse is the fifth-leading cause of death
among Alaska Natives, with a mortality rate 16.1 times higher than the
national rate for whites.37 Deaths from alcohol abuse increased by 34%
from 1980 to 2008.38 The alcohol-related mortality rate in remote Alaska
villages is 3.5 times the national average and the alcohol-related suicide
rate is 6 times the national average.39
Drug and alcohol use in violation of rural law is troubling. There
33. Alaska Rural Justice & Law Enforcement Comm’n, Initial Report and
Recommendations of the Alaska Rural Justice and Law Enforcement Commission, STATE
ALASKA DEPARTMENT L. 54 n.102 (2006), http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/
press/040606-ARJLEC-report.pdf.
34. Id.
35. Rivera et al., supra note 2, at 31; Postle et al., supra note 4, at 35. These
figures are statewide and not necessarily confined to rural areas. The lower
numbers for sexual assault can be explained in part due to the offense being
more likely to be committed by minors less likely to drink alcohol.
36. Alaska State Troopers, Alaska Bureau of Investigation Statewide Drug
Enforcement Unit, 2013 Annual Drug Report, ALASKA DEPARTMENT PUB. SAFETY 5
(2013), http://www.dps.state.ak.us/AST/ABI/docs/SDEUreports/2013%20
Annual%20Drug%20Report.pdf.
37. Gretchen Day et al., Alaska Native Epidemiology Ctr., Alaska Native
Mortality Update: 2004-2008, ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL HEALTH CONSORTIUM 4 (Oct.
2011),
http://www.anthctoday.org/epicenter/publications/mortality/
AlaskaNativeMortalityUpdate2004_2008_17_jan_2012.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2014, S. 1474, 113th Cong. §
2(a)(2) (as introduced in Senate, Aug. 1, 2013), available at
https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s1474/BILLS-113s1474is.pdf
(enacted
without relevant language as Repeal of Special Rule for State of Alaska, Pub. L.
No. 113-275, 128 Stat. 2988 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ275/pdf/PLAW113publ275.pdf).
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are currently 108 communities in Alaska, mostly off the road system,
that have local laws prohibiting the sale, importation, and possession of
alcohol.40 Despite this, illegal alcohol use and bootlegging remain
prevalent. A $10 bottle of alcohol from Anchorage or Fairbanks can sell
for $150 to $300 in a remote village.41 This is more than 10 times the
mark-up price for cocaine.42 And, because of the significant expense to
law enforcement to travel to villages off the road system for
investigation of what may be seen as relatively minor crimes, illegal
alcohol use and bootlegging are frequently unprosecuted.43
Also concerning are alcohol and drug use among minors.
According to one statewide study, 42.68% of minors ages 12 to 17 in
Alaska are assessed to be at great risk of having five or more alcoholic
drinks once or twice a week, and 5.39% suffer from alcohol dependence
or abuse.44 Among minors in Alaska ages 12 to 20, 25.44% used alcohol
in the month prior to the study, and 18.57% binge drank (had five or
more alcoholic drinks on the same occasion) in that month.45 Marijuana
was used by 15.87% of youth ages 12 to 17 in the year preceding the
study, and 9.18% in the previous month.46 Within the Alaska Court
System, there were 1,570 total Minor Consuming Alcohol cases during
2011 in courts serving primarily rural areas, and 1,187 guilty pleas or
convictions among those cases.47

40. Alaska State Troopers, Alaska Bureau of Investigation Statewide Drug
Enforcement Unit, supra note 36, at 7. This does not include any tribal laws
limiting or banning alcohol.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Emblematic is a statement made to the Indian Law and Order
Commission at a public hearing by the city manager of Fort Yukon (off the road
system): “Alcohol is probably 95 percent of our problem, but the State says we
have no Tribal authority to fight bootlegging locally when they’re hundreds of
miles away—and only by airplane much of the year. The State and the Feds
won’t step up . . . .” ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24.
44. Table 14 of 2008-2009 NSDUH State Estimates of Substance Use and Mental
Disorders, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN.,
httP://media.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/2k09State/NSDUHsae2009/Index.asp
x (follow “PDF” hyperlink in the “Alaska (AK)” row of the Table of Contents at
the bottom of the page) (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
45. Id.; see also Alaska Youth Risk Behavior Survey, ALASKA DEPARTMENT
HEALTH & SOC. SERVICES, DIVISION PUB. HEALTH (2013), http://
dhss.alaska.gov/dph/Chronic/Documents/School/pubs/2013YRBS_Prelimina
ryHighlights.pdf.
46. 2008-2009 NSDUH State Estimates of Substance Use and Mental Disorders,
supra note 44.
47. Data provided by Alaska Court System to author (on file with author).
Minor Consuming Alcohol cases from courts in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau,
and Palmer were excluded from these totals. Some numbers in particular rural
courts stick out: there were fifty-six Minor Consuming Alcohol cases and forty-
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Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction as a Means of Empowering Tribes to
Address Problems in Their Community

The dire situation facing rural Alaska Natives has been recognized
nationally. In November 2013, the Indian Law and Order Commission
(ILOC), pursuant to the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, issued a
report titled “A Roadmap for Making Native America Safer” (“ILOC
Roadmap”) to the President and Congress analyzing law enforcement
and criminal justice issues on reservations and other areas governed by
tribal courts.48 An entire chapter of the ILOC Roadmap was devoted to
Alaska: “Reforming Justice for Alaska Natives: The Time is Now.”49
Alaska was the only state singled out for its own chapter. The ILOC
Roadmap, citing some of the studies just discussed and other troubling
statistics, justified this attention based on the endemic sexual assault,
domestic violence and other public safety issues experienced by Alaska
tribes. Many of these tribes are inaccessible by roads, have limited law
enforcement presence if any, and lack access to substance abuse
services.50
All of this raises the issue of the role of rural courts, including tribal
courts, in stemming this epidemic of violence and alcohol abuse among
Alaska Natives and in rural Alaska. The ILOC Roadmap addresses the
very limited role that tribes and tribal courts in Alaska currently play in
resolving criminal offenses and determining the resulting punishment.51
While there are 230 federally recognized tribes in Alaska,52 the number

three convictions in Chevak (population: 938, of which 464 are under age 21);
twenty-nine cases and twenty-five convictions in Emmonak (population: 762, of
which 338 are under age 21); forty-one cases and forty convictions in St. Mary’s
(population: 507, of which 217 are under age 21 ); and forty-nine cases and fortythree convictions in Unalakleet (population: 688, of which 244 are under age 21).
See id. (providing case and conviction totals); List of Counties and Cities in Alaska,
SUBURBANSTATS.COM,
https://suburbanstats.org/population/alaska/list-ofcounties-and-cities-in-alaska (last visited Feb. 8, 2015) (compiling population
data).
48. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24. National recognition also came through a
CNN Change the List exposé highlighting the high epidemic of rape in rural
Alaska. John D. Sutter, The Rapist Next Door, CNN (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/opinion/sutter-change-alaskarape/index.html.
49. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 33–61.
50. Id. at ch. 2, at 35–43.
51. Id. at ch. 2, at 43–49.
52. See Alaska Region Overview, U.S. DEPARTMENT INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/Alaska/ (last visited Apr.
15, 2015) (“[There are] 229 Federally Recognized Tribes under the jurisdiction of
the Alaska Regional Office”); Metlakatla Agency, U.S. DEPARTMENT INTERIOR:
INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/RegionalOffices/
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of operating tribal courts in Alaska is unclear.53 Regardless of their
number, however, these tribal courts are largely excluded from
exercising jurisdiction over criminal cases. The ILOC Roadmap notes
that “the State [of Alaska] has asserted exclusive criminal jurisdiction
over all lands once controlled by tribes” and that this “has led to a
dramatic under-provision of criminal justice services in rural and Native
regions.”54 It follows this with a concerning analysis: “[The State] has
also limited collaboration with local governments (Alaska Native or
not), which could be the State’s most valuable partners in crime
prevention and the restoration of public safety.”55
Tribal courts need to be empowered to be co-equal participants in
rural Alaska’s criminal justice system. Due to their limited resources,
tribes are likely to focus on the relatively lesser offenses, which are
generally easier to handle. One study suggests that, despite the
geographic challenges, the State of Alaska does just as good a job (if not
better) prosecuting sexual assaults in rural Alaska as it does in urban
areas.56 This may be an indictment of the criminal justice system as a
whole, but it may also indicate that efforts for increasing tribal court
jurisdiction are best focused on some of the lesser crimes—such as
alcohol abuse or misdemeanor assault—that lead to more serious acts of
domestic violence, rather than on creating jurisdiction geared toward
imprisonment.
In other words, the purpose of establishing tribal court criminal
jurisdiction is not so that tribes can prosecute cases like the recent killing
of two Alaska State Troopers in Tanana.57 Those cases will certainly be

Northwest/WeAre/Metlakatla/ (showing the agency for the one reservation in
Alaska within the Northwest Regional Office).
53. Surveys indicate there exist somewhere between 78 and 152 active tribal
courts, but the accuracy of these numbers is questionable. ILOC Roadmap, supra
note 24, at ch. 2, at 39 (citing 2012 Alaska Tribal Court Directory, ALASKA LEGAL
SERVICES CORP. (2012), http://alaskatribes.org/uploads/2012-tc-directory.pdf);
Steven W. Perry, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Tribal Crime Data Collection Activities, 2014,
BUREAU JUST. STAT.
3
(July
2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/tcdca14.pdf.
54. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 43.
55. Id.
56. See Wood et al., supra note 22, at 342–43 (finding that geographic
isolation facilitates case processing because sexual assault cases are more likely
to be referred for prosecution).
57. The violence in rural Alaska and difficulties of remote policing are
exemplified by an incident that occurred on May 1, 2014 in which two Alaska
State Troopers were killed with a semi-automatic rifle by the 19-year-old son of a
man that the Troopers had come to the off-the-road-system village to question
for allegedly threatening a VPSO with a firearm. Suzanna Caldwell & Tegan
Hanlon, 19-Year-Old Arrested for Killing Two Troopers in Tanana; 2nd Man Charged
After Standoff, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 2, 2014), http://www.adn.com/
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prosecuted vigorously in the State system. However, the individual who
initiated these tragic events had a long history of lesser offenses that
could have been addressed by the local tribal court before they escalated
out of control.58 Many of these lesser offenses may not have been
prosecuted because of the practical difficulties facing law enforcement
and the judicial system in rural Alaska. Similarly, the volume of rapes,
sexual assaults of adults and minors, and violent physical assaults can
be reduced in part through tribal court prosecution of alcohol use and
abuse and lesser physical assaults before they escalate to more serious
offenses. Minors largely ignored by the state courts can be prosecuted,
sentenced, and put on a better path by tribal courts before alcohol and
violence take over their lives. Tribal court criminal jurisdiction will by
no means be a cure for all that ails rural Alaska Natives, but it is an
important tool in this effort. As one Native leader stated, “The most
basic priority for allowing tribes to address the impact of violence on
Native youth and in tribal communities is to provide tribal governments
with the jurisdiction they need to ensure the safety and well-being of
tribal citizens.”59
But to accomplish all of this, tribes in Alaska must become active
participants in exercising criminal jurisdiction. This Article argues that
2014/05/02/3451145/two-alaska-state-troopers-killed.html; Suzanna Caldwell,
Questions Surround Motives of Young Man Accused of Killing 2 Troopers,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS
(May
5,
2014),
http://www.adn.com/
2014/05/05/3456853/questions-surround-motives-of.html. The day before the
Troopers were killed, the father had been involved in a dispute about an unpaid
bill for a sofa. Lisa Demer & Tegan Hanlon, Details Emerge in Killing of 2 Troopers
in Tanana as State Mourns, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 2, 2014),
http://www.adn.com/2014/05/02/3452551/troopers-fatal-shootingsfollowed.html. When confronted by a VPSO, the father, possibly intoxicated,
sped off on an ATV and later pointed a gun at the VPSO from his porch. Id. The
VPSO called the incident in to the Troopers. Id. The tribal court in the Native
Village of Tanana is in the process of considering a permanent banishment
proceeding against the father along with another man for repeated threats of
violence toward members of the tribal council and other village residents.
Suzanna Caldwell, Tanana Moves to Banish Two in Wake of Trooper Shooting,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (May 8, 2014), http://www.adn.com/2014/
05/08/3462047/tanana-moves-to-banish-two-in.html [hereinafter Tanana Moves
to Banish]; Jerzy Shedlock, Nearly a Year After Troopers’ Killings, Tanana Looks
Forward, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (April 21, 2015), http://www.adn.com/article/
20150421/nearly-year-after-troopers-killings-tanana-looks-forward.
58. As the ILOC Roadmap concluded, “control and accountability by local
Tribes is critical for improving public safety. It brings to the table place-specific
knowledge of what may work best to prevent crime and social disorder.” ILOC
Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch.2, at 43.
59. Jacqueline Pata, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Testimony
before the Task Force on American Indian/Alaska Native Children Exposed to
Violence (June 11, 2014), quoted in Att’y Gen.’s Advisory Comm. on Am. Indian
& Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence, supra note 24, at 132.
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Alaska tribal courts have inherent criminal jurisdiction over tribal
members, despite not having reservation land over which to exercise
this jurisdiction, and despite the State’s assertions to the contrary. Not
only is criminal jurisdiction legally justified, it is necessary to combat the
epidemics of domestic violence and of alcohol and drug use in rural
Alaska.60
Part I of this Article offers a sketch of the foundational principles of
tribal sovereignty in Supreme Court precedent, followed by an overview
of tribal criminal jurisdiction61 in the Lower 48,62 which differs from
Alaska primarily in that Lower 48 tribes usually have reservation land
that sets clear boundaries for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Part II
turns to Alaska to trace a cursory history of civil jurisdiction for tribal
courts in the state, with an emphasis on the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act and its impact on tribal court jurisdiction. Part III of the
Article briefly reviews some of the proposed solutions to the problems
of domestic violence and alcohol abuse in rural Alaska, including the
solutions proposed by the ILOC Roadmap and Alaska’s efforts to refer
state cases to tribal courts. Part IV makes the legal argument for initial
tribal court criminal jurisdiction in Alaska independent of reservation
land or Indian county, addressing both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction.

60. The focus of this Article is on legal arguments relating to tribal court
criminal jurisdiction in Alaska. There are many practical challenges to Alaska
tribes exercising criminal jurisdiction, from Alaska’s remote geography and
sparse rural infrastructure to the lack of funding for tribal courts and the paucity
of information on the support needs of Alaska tribes, but these issues are beyond
the scope of this Article. For a brief introduction to these challenges, see Att’y
Gen.’s Advisory Comm. on Am. Indian & Alaska Native Children Exposed to
Violence, supra note 24, at 140–43. This report largely endorsed the five
recommendations from the ILOC Roadmap, though it also had a broader focus
on recommendations for addressing funding needs and social programs to
combat the epidemic of domestic violence and child abuse in rural Alaska. See
generally id.
61. The latter flows from the former. Indeed, virtually all of Indian law can
be seen in one way or another as a discourse on tribal sovereignty.
62. The term “Lower 48,” as opposed to “Continental U.S.,” is used to
describe Indian law in the rest of the United States because, despite the rather
large intervening land mass that is Canada, Alaska is still part of the North
American continent.
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NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY AND CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION IN THE LOWER 48

The Marshall Trilogy

The history of Native American sovereignty, and Native American
law in general, begins with the famed Marshall Trilogy—three cases
from the early 1800s, all authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, that
established the foundations of Native American law and are still
frequently invoked today. For present purposes, each case stands for a
different key principle. Johnson v. M’Intosh63 advanced the notion of
“aboriginal title,” which defined and limited the land rights of precolonial Native Americans. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia64 affirmed the trust
relationship between the federal government and Native Americans.
And Worcester v. Georgia65 established the supremacy of federal law over
state law for Native American relations.
1.

Johnson v. M’Intosh

Johnson v. M’Intosh centered on a dispute over ownership of land in
what at the time was the Illinois Country.66 Johnson and others
purchased the land in 1775 from the Piankeshaw Indian tribe.67
M’Intosh, on the other hand, claimed the United States acquired the land
by conquest (by the French and then ceded to the British following the
French-Indian War) from the Indian tribes and he, in turn, acquired it
through a grant by Congress in 1784.68 The question before the Court
was which of these grants of title should be recognized.69
The Court found in favor of M’Intosh’s claim, holding that the
Native Americans lacked a property interest in the land that allowed
them to transfer title to Johnson.70 The Court reached this conclusion
after a long and winding narrative on the history of European settlement

63. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
64. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
65. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
66. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 560; see also Lindsay G. Robertson, The Judicial
Conquest of North America: The Story of Johnson v. M’Intosh, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES 29 (Carole Goldberg et al., eds. 2011) (providing general background on
the history behind the case).
67. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 555. Johnson’s heirs participated in the case. Id. at
561.
68. Id. at 554–59.
69. Id. at 572.
70. Id. at 588–89.
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of North America.71 Under the “doctrine of discovery,” the initial
European power that discovered a particular territory was granted title
to that territory, and other European countries by custom recognized
that claim.72 The doctrine ignored the role of Native Americans
entirely.73 When the United States became independent, it assumed all
property rights and titles formerly possessed by the various colonies.74
This included securing property rights away from the Native
Americans.75
The Native American inhabitants were left only with “Indian title”
or “aboriginal title.”76 According to the Court, if the Indian tribes kept
their lands, the country would have remained a “wilderness.”77 The
Native Americans only held a right to peacefully occupy their former
land, for the doctrine of discovery denied their complete sovereignty as
independent nations.78 Consequently, “their power to dispose of the soil
at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the
original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to
those who made it.”79 This limited right to use and occupy their land,
but not to own it, placed Native Americans in a perpetually subordinate
position to the United States government with regard to land
ownership.
2.

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia

In the first of two so-called Cherokee or “removal” cases, the
Cherokee Nation sought an injunction against Georgia laws that would
have essentially annexed the Cherokee lands as state lands.80 The
Cherokees argued they were a sovereign and self-governing nation, and
71. Id. at 574–87. The contents of the history are less important than the fact
that such a significant portion of the opinion is spent on this history to justify its
decision.
72. Id. at 573.
73. See id. at 588–89 (focusing on the rights of the conquering powers
instead).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS
54 (3d ed. 2012). The right to aboriginal title rests with the tribe as a whole for
the “common use and equal benefit of all the members” and not with particular
individuals. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307 (1902).
77. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 590.
78. Id. at 574.
79. Id.
80. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831); see Rennard Strickland,
The Struggle for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases, in INDIAN LAW
STORIES, supra note 66, at 61 (providing additional background on the Cherokee
cases).
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therefore the laws of Georgia did not apply to them.81 The Court denied
the injunction, concluding that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign
nation but rather a “domestic dependent nation” within the United
States and was under the protection of the United States.82 Because of
this status, the Court decided the case on standing grounds, holding that
the Cherokee Nation could not sue in federal courts.83 In doing so the
Court established, rather paternalistically, that the United States has a
federal trust relationship over Native Americans.84
3.

Worcester v. Georgia

The last case in the Marshall Trilogy addressed whether the laws of
the State of Georgia applied in Cherokee lands. Having overcome the
standing issue that resolved Cherokee Nation, Worcester centered on
whether Samuel Worcester could be criminally charged and convicted
for preaching on Cherokee land in violation of Georgia law.85 The Court
overturned the conviction, holding with clear language that the
Cherokee Nation was a distinct community with its own territory and
within which state law could have no force.86 However, the Court
reached this conclusion on the grounds that the power asserted by
Georgia actually rested with the federal government.87 In other words,
the Court established limited sovereignty for Native American tribes,
but only with regard to state governments. Tribes were still, pursuant to
the doctrine of discovery, subject to the power and control of the United
States.88 This relationship has persisted, with the federal government

81. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
82. See id. at 17 (“[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside
within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can . . . be
denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. . . . Their relation to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”).
83. Id. at 20.
84. See id. at 17 (“They look to our government for protection; rely upon its
kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the
president as their great father.”).
85. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 521, 536 (1832); see also Strickland, supra
note 80, at 72 (providing additional background on the Cherokee cases).
86. Id. at 561.
87. See id. at 520 (“The whole intercourse between the United States and [the
Cherokee] nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States.”).
88. See id. at 519 (“The Indian nations had always been considered as
distinct, independent political communities . . . with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any
other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular
region claimed . . . .”).
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and Congress still holding ultimate authority over tribal relations.89
States can regulate tribes, however, if they are delegated that authority
by the federal government.90
B.

Federal and State Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country

While the Marshall Trilogy sets out the basic foundations of federal
Indian law in the United States, the application of these principles to an
area such as criminal law is highly complex. The overview here is not
exhaustive of all criminal jurisdiction issues facing Native Americans in
the Lower 48.91 Rather, it merely provides a framework for
understanding the general parameters of tribal criminal jurisdiction, so
that the particular issues facing Alaska tribes can be juxtaposed against
this framework. This Section presumes that tribes are exercising
jurisdiction over reservation land, which is generally not the case in
Alaska.
Understanding criminal jurisdiction in Indian country requires
examining the type of crime, the parties involved in the criminal offense,
and whether the federal government has assigned its jurisdiction to the
states. First and foremost, however, one must understand what the term
“Indian country” encompasses.
1.

Indian Country

By federal statute, Indian country consists of one of three
classifications of land: (a) reservation lands; (b) dependent Indian
communities; and (c) Indian allotments.92 All three imply some sort of
federal trust relationship over the land.93
A reservation is any body of land with defined boundaries set aside

89. NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
511–12 (2012); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 18
(5th ed. 2009).
90. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 109 (4th ed. 2012).
91. For more extensive treatment of this subject, see generally NEWTON ET AL.,
supra note 89, at 735–81; CANBY, supra note 89, at 138–257; PEVAR, supra note 90, at
127–48.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Although this statute directly applies to
establishing criminal jurisdiction, the definition of Indian country therein has
also been held to apply to civil cases as well. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie
Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
93. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45–46 (1912) (“[L]ong
continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation
the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders . . . .”).
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by the federal government, usually through treaty or congressional
action, for the benefit of its Indian inhabitants.94 Land within reservation
boundaries is still considered Indian country even if title to the land has
passed out of Indian hands.95
A dependent Indian community is land which a tribe owns in fee
simple, but which has not been formally set aside as a reservation.96 For
land to be considered a dependent Indian community, it must satisfy a
two-part test: (1) the land must have been set aside by the federal
government to be used as Indian lands; and (2) the land must be under
federal supervision.97
Whereas reservations and dependent Indian communities are
intended for the benefit of tribes as a whole, allotments are tracts of land
set aside for the benefit of individual Indians, typically (albeit not
exclusively) through the General Allotment Act of 1887.98 Allotment
lands that have not been sold in fee simple remain in federal trust, and
there are substantial restrictions on alienation of allotment land.99 The
allotment process left many reservations a checkerboard of differing
jurisdictions depending on the ownership of the land.100
2.

“Major” Versus “Minor” Crimes

In 1883, a Sioux named Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog in English) was
convicted in a federal court in the Dakota Territory for the murder in
Indian country of a Sioux chief, Sin-ga-ge-le-Scka (Spotted Tail).101 The
94. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909).
95. Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351,
357–58 (1962).
96. See Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45–46 (holding that lands occupied by the
Pueblo people in New Mexico, and for which they had title while under Spanish
rule, were still Indian country because the inhabitants were in need of federal
guardianship).
97. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. at 527.
98. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). Also known as the
Dawes Act, the General Allotment Act was an attempt to transfer tribal land into
individual hands, though in a way that opened up the land to ownership by
non-Indians and resulted in the virtual dissolution of large portions of many
reservations. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 72–73. Through the General
Allotment Act, Indian title to land was reduced from 138 million acres to 48
million acres over the course of less than 50 years. Id. at 73. This Act only applied
in the Lower 48; a separate allotment act for Alaska was passed in 1906. CASE &
VOLUCK, supra note 76, at 113. The process of dissolving reservations through the
General Allotment Act ceased with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 1075.
99. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 195–96, 1046–57.
100. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 73.
101. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556,
557 (1883) (Crow Dog).
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Sioux tribal council previously sentenced Crow Dog to restitution, but
the federal government viewed this sentence as too lenient.102 In Ex Parte
Crow Dog, a decision that implicitly extended the principles of Worcester,
the Supreme Court held that the federal government did not have
jurisdiction to prosecute a crime between two Indians and reversed the
conviction.103 In response, Congress quickly passed the Indian Major
Crimes Act in 1885,104 which asserted federal jurisdiction in Indian
country over a series of felony-level crimes where both the offender and
victim were Indians.105
Crow Dog’s case stems from the first exception in the 1854 Indian
Country Crimes Act,106 also known as the General Crimes Act, which
extended federal criminal law into Indian country except for crimes
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian, crimes for which tribes retained jurisdiction by treaty, and
crimes where the Indian defendant had already been punished under
tribal law.107 The exception still remains in the statute, meaning that
crimes not included in the Major Crimes Act committed by an Indian
against another Indian in Indian country can only be prosecuted within
tribal court through its inherent sovereignty.108 However, because the
exception only applies where both the offender and the victim are
Indian, non-major offenses committed by Indians against non-Indians
can be prosecuted by the federal government through its extension of
jurisdiction under the Indian Country Crimes Act.109
Because tribes are considered a separate government with inherent
sovereignty and not an extension of the federal government, tribal
prosecution of an Indian offender does not create double jeopardy, and
both the tribe and the federal government can prosecute the offender for

102. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW CASES AND
COMMENTARY 93 (2d. ed. 2010). Crow Dog was sentenced to pay $600, eight
horses, and one blanket to the family of the deceased. Id.
103. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572 (relying upon treaties with the Sioux in
reaching its holding).
104. Ch. 341 § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1887) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (2012)).
105. Id. The crimes initially included in the Act were murder, manslaughter,
rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and larceny. PEVAR, supra note
90, at 79. The Act has been modified several times since then and now includes
most felony offenses against a person or property. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
106. Act of Mar. 27, 1854 ch. 26 § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. For further discussion, see DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 472–74 (6th ed. 2011).
108. 18 U.S.C § 1152.
109. PEVAR, supra note 90, at 139–40. The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
13, permits prosecution of state criminal offenses on federal enclaves like
reservations. Id.
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violation of their respective laws.110 This, however, only applies to major
crimes, since the Indian Country Crimes Act includes an exception for
non-major crimes whereby the federal government cannot prosecute an
Indian who has already been punished by the tribe.111
3.

Indian Versus Non-Indian Offenders

Normally, when criminal jurisdiction is exercised over a territory, it
is exercised over all individuals for crimes committed in that territory
regardless of the race of the alleged offender. However, this is not the
case with Indian country. In the landmark case of Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe,112 the Supreme Court held that tribes lacked criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Rejecting the argument that tribes could
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians through their inherent
sovereignty, the Court looked to the history of treaties with Indians and
congressional action regarding the jurisdiction of tribal courts (such as
the acts discussed above) to reason that “Indians do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such
power by Congress.”113 Due to their dependence on the federal
government, tribes were only “quasi-sovereign” with regard to their
lands.114 Tribes, according to the Court, only occupied their lands with
the assent of the federal government.115 Granting tribes criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians would compromise the “overriding
sovereignty of the United States.”116 Though Oliphant involved two
individuals violating tribal law on the reservation,117 the opinion does
not suggest that it is limited to Indian country. And now, after
subsequent litigation and congressional action,118 any tribe has criminal

110. See generally United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that a
Navajo tribal member could be prosecuted both in tribal court for contributing
to the delinquency of a minor and in federal court for statutory rape arising from
the same event).
111. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 748 (discussing this exception).
112. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
113. Id. at 208.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 209.
116. See id. at 210 (“By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian
citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”).
117. Id. at 194.
118. The intervening case of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193 (2004), which limited tribal criminal jurisdiction only to tribal members, and
the federal statute that overturned Duro, will be discussed later. See infra text
accompanying notes 281–90.
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jurisdiction over any Indian, regardless of where the alleged offender is
from or to what tribe he or she belongs.
Still, the inability to prosecute non-Indians creates substantial
problems when one considers that many non-Indians live on Indian
country land and a significant number of crimes against Indians in
Indian country are committed by non-Indians.119 With respect to
domestic violence, Congress attempted to address this with the 2013
revisions to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA).120 The revisions
permit tribes to exercise “special domestic violence criminal
jurisdiction” over perpetrators of domestic violence who would
otherwise escape their jurisdiction (i.e., non-Indians).121 To fall under
tribal court jurisdiction, the defendant must either (1) reside in Indian
country belonging to the tribe, (2) be employed by the tribe on its Indian
country, or, most importantly, (3) be a spouse, intimate partner, or
dating partner of a tribal member or another Indian who resides in
Indian country of the tribe.122 Defendants under this special jurisdiction
are provided additional safeguards not required for Indian defendants
for like offenses, namely the right to a jury trial,123 publicly available
criminal laws, and rules of evidence and procedure,124 as well as the
requirement that if a term of imprisonment is imposed, the judge must
be a licensed attorney and indigent defendants must be provided an
attorney at the expense of the tribal government.125 Written into the
VAWA reauthorization was an exception that exempted Alaska (other
than the Metlakatla reservation) from application of this expanded
jurisdiction, though the ability of tribal courts to issue civil protective
orders was preserved.126 Commonly known as the “Alaska Exception”

119. M. Brent Leonhard, Closing a Gap in Indian Country Justice: Oliphant,
Lara, and DOJ’S Proposed Fix, 28 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 118, 121–28
(2012).
120. The Violence Against Women Act was originally passed as Title IV of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796. The 2013 revisions were passed as the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54.
121. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(6).
122. Id. § 1304(b)(4)(B).
123. Id. § 1304(d)(3). The jury must be composed of members of the entire
community and not just tribal members. Id.
124. Id. § 1304(d)(2) (referencing id. § 1302(c)).
125. Id. (referencing id. § 1302(c)); see PEVAR, supra note 90, at 241–52
(explaining the contents of Section 1302(c)). All of these requirements are present
for Indian defendants sentenced for more than one year (but less than three)
imprisonment, but are not required per se for all domestic violence offenses. Id. §
1302(c).
126. S. 47, 113th Cong. § 910 (2013) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e) regarding
enforcement of protective orders).
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to VAWA, this section was repealed in late 2014.127
4.

Federal Versus State Jurisdiction

The general rule, as seen in Worcester, is that federal law has
supremacy over state law with regard to Indian law.128 This means that
the federal government is the only authority that may prosecute
criminal activity in Indian country if the tribe does not. However, the
federal government can delegate this authority to the states, and did just
that with Public Law 280 in 1953.129 That law delegated to designated
states whatever federal jurisdiction existed over criminal matters in
Indian country in that state.130 Public Law 280 initially only covered
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin, but was
amended in 1958 to include all of Alaska except for Annette Island, the
location of the Metlakatla reservation.131
This transfer of authority applies to both the Major Crimes Act and
the Indian Country Crimes Act, essentially withdrawing federal
jurisdiction in these areas and substituting state jurisdiction.132 However,
nothing in Public Law 280 strips tribal courts in covered states of their
inherent jurisdiction. Indeed, this was recognized by the Ninth Circuit
with regard to Alaska in Native Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v.
Alaska,133 which rejected an argument by the State that Public Law 280
divested tribes of their inherent jurisdiction to govern internal
relations.134 The court relied upon the inherent sovereignty of the tribes
in reaching this conclusion.135 Tribes therefore exercise concurrent
criminal jurisdiction in states recognized by Public Law 280.136

127. Repeal of Special Rule for State of Alaska, Pub. L. No. 113-275, 127 Stat.
2988 (2014) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ275/pdf/PLAW-113publ275.pdf.
128. NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 391, 489, 492–96.
129. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162,
1360); see PEVAR, supra note 90, at 142 (discussing Public Law 280).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a).
131. Id.; CANBY, supra note 89, at 261.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c).
133. 944 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1991).
134. See id. at 561 (“The [United States Supreme] Court has rejected all
interpretations of Public Law 280 which would result in an undermining or
destruction of tribal governments.”) (citing, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207–12, 222 (1987)).
135. Id. at 556.
136. See Booth v. State, 903 P.2d 1079, 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that the State and the Metlakatla Indian Community had concurrent jurisdiction
over charges arising from the same actions and that double jeopardy did not
apply under federal law, but that state statute prevented separate prosecutions
because Metlakatla qualified as a “territory” for purposes of the law). The statute
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Summary

This admittedly brief and incomplete overview of American Indian
law in general provides a few key takeaways. From the Marshall Trilogy
we get the underlying principles of much of subsequent American
Indian law: American Indians have limited title to their land in the form
of “aboriginal title”; the federal government has a trust relationship
obligation toward American Indians; and federal Indian law is supreme
over that of states. Subsequent litigation and legislation has further
refined these principles by providing a definition of Indian country that
has served as a primary basis for determining tribal jurisdiction. With
regard to criminal law, tribal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over
minor criminal offenses between Indians, but the federal government
has jurisdiction over major crimes and non-Indian victims. Moreover,
Indian tribes can only prosecute Indian offenders and cannot criminally
prosecute non-Indians, except as authorized under VAWA. All of this
serves as a background context for understanding later arguments
regarding tribal court criminal jurisdiction in Alaska and the unique
challenges that exist in Alaska for establishing criminal jurisdiction
absent Indian country. Before exploring the arguments for criminal
jurisdiction for Alaska tribes, though, it is important to first set out how
tribal civil jurisdiction has developed in Alaska, as this history provides
the foundation from which the arguments for criminal jurisdiction must
arise.

II. TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION IN ALASKA: A HISTORY OF
ALASKA NATIVES AND LAND
The history of tribal court jurisdiction in Alaska, and in particular
civil jurisdiction, is a history of the relationship between Alaska Natives
and their land as seen through the lens of United States and Alaska
legislation and case law. This history can be divided into roughly three
phases—first, confusion over the legal status of Alaska Natives
stemming from the acquisition of Alaska by the United States from
Russia; second, the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA)137 and its divestment of Alaska Native jurisdiction over land;
and third, the reconstruction of an alternate view of tribal jurisdiction
based not on land but on tribal membership. The first two of these
phases are discussed in this Part, with the discussion of member-based
jurisdiction reserved for the argument in favor of criminal jurisdiction
at issue in Booth has since been repealed. § 40, 2008 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 75.
137. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h.
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that is ultimately not dependent on the presence of Indian country.
A.

Alaska Natives and Aboriginal Title

The history of Russian Alaska is not one of respect for the territorial
sovereignty of the original inhabitants. Alaska Natives were ignored,
assimilated, and enslaved by the colonizing Russians.138 When it came
time to sell Alaska to the United States, the Treaty of Cession139
governing the sale divided the indigenous people of Alaska into two
broad categories—the “civilized” tribes and the “uncivilized” tribes.140
Those among the civilized tribes, mainly those Alaska Natives who had
adopted Russian culture, could repatriate to Russia or remain in Alaska
and obtain United States citizenship.141 The fate of the “uncivilized
tribes”142 was more ambiguous. The Treaty of Cession said only that
these peoples were “subject to such laws and regulations as the United
States may, from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that
country.”143
The First Organic Act,144 which established civilian government in
Alaska, took a similar stance.145 Addressing the status of Alaska Natives
more directly, the Act stated that “the Indians or other persons in said
138. See generally KATERINA G. SOLOVJOVA & ALEKSANDRA A. VOVNYANKO, THE
FUR RUSH: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE HISTORY OF ALASKA AT THE END OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (Richard L. Bland & Katya S. Wessels trans. 2002), as
reprinted in THE ALASKA NATIVE READER: HISTORY, CULTURE, POLITICS 28–41
(Maria Shaa Tláa Williams ed. 2009). See also DOUGLAS W. VELTRA, Perspectives on
Aleut Culture Change During the Russian Period, in RUSSIAN AMERICA: THE
FORGOTTEN FRONTIER 175–83 (Barbara Sweetland Smith & Redmond J. Barnett
eds. 1990).
139. Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North
America by his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to the United States of
America, U.S.-Russ., June 20, 1867, 15 Stat. 539 [hereinafter Treaty of Cession].
140. Id. at art. III. But it might be more appropriate to say that the indigenous
inhabitants of Alaska were divided into the “uncivilized tribes” and a nondefined group of everyone else. The Treaty of Cession identifies the “uncivilized
tribes” of Alaska but does not identify any other category of Alaska Natives. Id.
141. Id.; see United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442, 445–46 (D. Alaska 1905)
(describing the Treaty of Cession as dividing inhabitants of Alaska into three
categories: (1) Russian subjects who wanted to return to Russia; (2) Russian
subjects who wanted to remain in Alaska and could be granted citizenship; and
(3) the uncivilized tribes).
142. These were defined in a subsequent case as “the independent tribes of
pagan faith who acknowledged no restraint from the Russians, and pracised
[sic] their ancient customs.” In re Naturalization of John Minook, 2 Alaska 200,
218 (D. Alaska 1904).
143. Treaty of Cession, supra note 139.
144. Act of May 17, 1884, Ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24.
145. CLAUS-M. NASKE & HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF THE 49TH
STATE 64–65 (1979).

ARTICLE 3 - FORTSON (DO NOT DELETE)

116

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/18/2015 2:05 PM

Vol. 32:1

district shall not be disturbed in the possession of any lands actually in
their use or occupation or now claimed by them but the terms under
which such persons may acquire title to such lands is reserved for future
legislation by Congress.”146 Essentially, this established aboriginal title
to the land reminiscent of Johnson v. M’Intosh,147 where the indigenous
inhabitants could use the land but not truly own it. It was not
surprising, then, when the Alaska District Court in 1905 held that Alaska
Natives could not sell the land they occupied, but that only Congress
could do so.148 The Supreme Court affirmed this position in 1955, when
it held that “mere possession” of land by Alaska Natives did not
constitute ownership of the land unless specifically recognized by
Congress.149 Since then, the federal government has been able to take
Alaska Native land without a need for just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment.150
Because it was generally believed that the General Allotment Act151
did not cover Alaska,152 a separate act in 1906—the Alaska Native
Allotment Act153—created an allotment process for Alaska by which
individual Alaska Natives could obtain legal title to a maximum of 160
acres of unappropriated federal land, provided that the applicant was
twenty-one years old and head of a family.154 However, even though the
Alaska Native would hold title, the land would remain in federal trust
status and could not be alienated or taxed.155 Additionally, a 1956
amendment to the Alaska Native Allotment Act further required that
allotment applicants show individual use of the land for at least five
years.156 While ANCSA (discussed further below) repealed the Alaska
Native Allotment Act, existing and pending allotments were not
extinguished.157 By the date the Act was repealed, 10,000 Alaska Natives
had applied for over 16,000 parcels of land covering over 400,000
acres.158
146. Act of May 17, 1884, § 8, 23 Stat. at 26 (emphasis added).
147. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
148. United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442, 449–51 (D. Alaska 1905).
149. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 285 (1955).
150. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 76, at 71.
151. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
152. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 76, at 117.
153. Act of May 17, 1906, ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197.
154. Early Alaska Native Land Cases and Acts, FED. INDIAN L. FOR ALASKA TRIBES
(Feb. 4, 2015), https://tm112.community.uaf.edu/unit-2/early-land-cases/.
155. Id.
156. Act of Aug. 2, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-931, 70 Stat. 954 (codified as amended
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 270–1 to 270–3).
157. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 76, at 121.
158. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-96-1107T, ALASKA NATIVE
ALLOTMENTS: ALTERNATIVES TO ADDRESS CONFLICTS WITH UTILITY RIGHTS-OF-WAY
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The rights that Alaska Natives and tribes had with regard to their
traditional lands remained unclear even under the Statehood Act in
1958.159 In Section 4 of the Statehood Act, the State of Alaska agreed to
“forever disclaim all right and title to . . . any lands or other property,
(including fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by any
Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is held by the
United States in trust for said natives.”160 This further delayed a
determination of Alaska Native land rights because the act asserted that
Alaska did not have rights to Native lands but failed to define that term.
Consequently, a problem arose when the State selected lands for state
use, since the relevant section of the Statehood Act maintained that the
State could only select public lands that were “vacant, unappropriated,
and unreserved at the time of their selection.”161
B.

ANCSA and Its Aftermath

The state land selection process took several years. The conflict
gained increasing importance as the discovery of large oil reserves in
Prudhoe Bay necessitated the construction of a pipeline.162 Matters came
to a head in 1966 when the Secretary of the Interior put a freeze on all
land selections pending a resolution of Alaska Native land claims.163
Because Congress could extinguish aboriginal title without
compensation, Congress was not required to reach a settlement with
Alaska Natives. In 1971, however, it did just that, and ANCSA went into
effect on December 18.164
ANCSA created a system of twelve regional Native corporations,165
4–5 (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO06-1107T/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-1107T.pdf.; NEWTON ET AL., supra note
89, at 340.
159. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). Although
Alaska became a state in 1959, the act allowing it to do so was passed in 1958. Id.
160. Id. § 4, 72 Stat. at 339.
161. Id. § 6(b), 72 Stat. at 340.
162. See Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished
Business, 43 TULSA L. REV. 17, 31 (2007) (“If one views it from the perspective of
the state and oil companies intent on development of oil and gas at Prudhoe
Bay, ANCSA was a resounding success.”).
163. Id. at 29.
164. RICHARD S. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT NO. 21-127 GOV,
ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1971 (PUBLIC LAW 92-203): HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS TOGETHER WITH SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS (1981), available at
http://www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/reports/rsjones1981/ancsa_history71
.htm.
165. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 76, at 170. There was a thirteenth corporation
created for Alaska Natives outside Alaska, but it does not have any land
ownership or issue dividends. Id.
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allotted 45.7 million acres to regional and village Native corporations,166
and provided for a payment of $962.5 million from combined federal
and state sources.167 Of particular importance for this Article is the fact
that the settlement extinguished all Alaska Native claims to aboriginal
title—past, pending, and future.168 ANCSA did not confirm the validity
of any aboriginal rights, but nonetheless extinguished any that might
exist.
The impact of ANCSA on Alaska Native land claims would not
fully play out until 1998 in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government.169 The Native Village of Venetie attempted to levy $161,000
in business taxes both on a contractor who built a school on land
conveyed to a village corporation through ANCSA and on the State of
Alaska itself, which Venetie alleged was also partially liable for the tax
under a joint venture agreement.170 The ability to levy a tax on nonmembers in this way depended upon whether the ANCSA land in
question was Indian country.171 After undertaking the analysis of the
three types of Indian country discussed earlier,172 the Court concluded
that ANCSA land was clearly not a reservation or an allotment.173 The
land was also not a dependent Indian community because, as land
conveyed for unrestricted use to private, state-chartered Native
corporations, the federal government neither set aside the land for the
use as Indian land, nor placed it under the superintendence of the
federal government.174 As a result, all land transferred to private hands
through ANCSA, which transferred this land in large part by
extinguishing all claims to aboriginal title, could not constitute Indian
country.175

166. Id. at 171.
167. Id. at 175.
168. See 43 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2012) (“All prior conveyances of public land and
water areas in Alaska, or any interest therein, pursuant to Federal law, and all
tentative approvals pursuant to section 6(g) of the Alaska Statehood Act, shall be
regarded as an extinguishment of the aboriginal title thereto, if any.”).
Subsequent subsections extinguished aboriginal title based on claims of use and
occupancy. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b)–(c).
169. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
170. Id. at 525.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 92–93.
173. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. at 527.
174. Id. at 532. It was not sufficient that the tribe was under federal
superintendence; the land itself had to be under federal superintendence. Id. at
531 n.5.
175. The Court noted that one of the primary purposes of ANCSA was “to
effect Native self-determination and to end paternalism in federal Indian
relations.” Id. at 522.
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III. PREVIOUSLY-PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PERCEIVED LACK
OF ALASKA NATIVE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
The statistics provided in the introduction to this Article regarding
the dire situation for Alaska Natives in rural Alaska indicate the need to
address the rampant alcohol abuse, domestic violence, and crime. Most
attempts to remedy these problems presume the need for land-based
criminal jurisdiction, consistent with the history of civil jurisdiction in
Alaska. While any attempt to expand the jurisdiction of Alaska tribal
courts is a step in the right direction, these proposed solutions are
narrower in scope than the recognition of inherent criminal jurisdiction
for the reasons discussed herein.
A.

Indian Law and Order Commission Roadmap

The most recent and most prominent example of attempts to
address the problems faced by Alaska Natives is the Indian Law and
Order Commission’s (ILOC) report titled “A Roadmap for Making
Native America Safer” (“ILOC Roadmap”).176 After providing an
overview of the difficulties facing Alaska Natives in rural Alaska, the
ILOC Roadmap offers five recommendations for increasing rural law
enforcement options: amend the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA)177 to overturn Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Government;178 redefine Indian country to include Alaska allotments and
townsites; amend ANCSA to allow land to be put into trust; repeal the
Alaska exception to the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA);179 and
affirm the inherent criminal jurisdiction of Alaska tribes.180
176. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24.
177. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012).
178. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
179. The Violence Against Women Act was originally passed as Title IV of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796. The 2013 revisions were passed as the Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54. The Alaska
Exception was located at S. 47, 113th Cong. § 910 (2013). Since the ILOC
Roadmap was published, the exception has been repealed. Repeal of Special
Rule for State of Alaska, Pub. L. No. 113-275, 127 Stat. 2988 (2014) (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 2265), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW113publ275/pdf/PLAW-113publ275.pdf.
180. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 51–55. The nine-member
commission, which is comprised of both Republicans and Democrats,
summarized its findings by saying that “Alaska’s approach to criminal justice
issues is fundamentally on the wrong track. The status quo in Alaska tends to
marginalize and frequently ignores the potential of tribally based justice
systems, intertribal institutions, and organizations to provide more cost-effective
and responsive alternatives to prevent crime and keep all Alaskans safer.” Id. at
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Amending ANCSA to Overturn Venetie Tribal Gov’t

The ILOC Roadmap urges Congress to overturn Venetie Tribal Gov’t
“by amending ANCSA to provide that former reservation lands
acquired in fee by Alaska Native villages and other lands transferred in
fee to Native villages pursuant to ANCSA are Indian country.”181 This
proposed solution is almost certainly politically unfeasible because it
would require the transfer of significant lands to Alaska tribes, resulting
in the ability of tribes to tax on those lands. While this would be positive
for the tribes occupying the land, political opposition from businesses
operating in Alaska would likely scuttle any chances of such legislation
passing.
Moreover, determining exact boundaries for villages would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, because Alaska Native villages do
not exist under a unified common ownership. Any given village is likely
made up of a patchwork of village-corporation ANCSA land and
privately held land.182 Thus, it is insufficient to simply assert that
village-corporation land can be a basis for criminal jurisdiction, because
that alone will not create a comprehensive land base for the village.
Houses on village corporation land would fall under the created tribal
jurisdiction, but homes on privately-owned land still within the village
would not.
2.

Clarifying that Native Allotments and Townsites in Alaska are
Indian Country

The ILOC Roadmap next suggests that Congress and the President
clarify that Native allotments and townsites in Alaska, which were
unaffected by ANCSA, are legally considered Indian country, thus
creating a land base for criminal jurisdiction.183 The ILOC Roadmap
notes that one source estimates that there are between four- and sixmillion acres held in Alaska Native allotments.184 Legislative or
executive action is one possible means of resolution, but this issue is
much more likely to be resolved in the courts, as there are no cases
holding that Native allotments and townsites in Alaska are not Indian

ch. 2, at 44.
181. Id. at ch. 2, at 51.
182. See Early Alaska Native Land Cases and Acts, supra note 154 (providing a
map showing ownership of land parcels).
183. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 52.
184. Id. (citing Natalie Landreth & Erin Dougherty, The Use of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act to Justify Disparate Treatment of Alaska’s Tribes, 36 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 321, 346–47 (2012)).
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country. But, while courts have ruled that Alaska Native allotments and
townsites are exempt from state taxation because of their federal trust
status and the acts by which they were created,185 they have not
definitively held that those allotments are Indian country.186
Even assuming that Alaska Native allotments and townsites are
Indian country (or were made such through legislative or executive
action), it is difficult to see how criminal jurisdiction could be
constructed based on lands to which individuals hold the title. Would
jurisdiction be assigned to the nearest tribe and their tribal law? What if
the allottee is a member of a different tribe or no longer lives in the area?
Or what if the allottee objects to his or her land creating tribal court
jurisdiction? Furthermore, allotment lands are usually traditional
hunting and fishing lands outside the village, severely limiting their
ability to serve as a basis for meaningful criminal jurisdiction.187
Townsite lands do not exist in every village and often form a patchwork
in those they do—much like the village-corporation lands described
above.188 At the very most, deriving criminal jurisdiction from
allotments and townsites would be only a partial and fragmented
solution and would not be a viable remedy for many villages.
3.

Allow ANCSA Corporation Lands to be Transferred to Tribal
Governments and Put into Trust

The ILOC Roadmap next suggests increasing the land base for
Alaska tribes by transferring ANCSA corporation lands to tribal
governments and allowing tribes to put land into trust. While
transferring land from Native corporations to tribal governments would
likely be helpful for providing an economic base for tribes, it would not
by itself create land-based tribal criminal jurisdiction. To the extent that
there is any chance that transferring land to tribal governments could
itself create criminal jurisdiction, it depends not on amending ANCSA
but on amending the definition of Indian country. The Indian country
status extinguished by ANCSA is not going to be retroactively restored
simply by title being held by a tribal government. As Venetie Tribal Gov’t
185. People of S. Naknek v. Bristol Bay Borough, 466 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D.
Alaska 1979).
186. See, e.g., id. at 877 (declining to decide whether the Village of South
Naknek is within Indian country); Jones v. State, 936 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Alaska
App. 1997) (holding in a criminal case involving hunting regulations that it is
not necessary to determine whether Alaska Native allotments are Indian
country).
187. Id.
188. See Early Alaska Native Land Cases and Acts, supra note 154 (providing a
map showing ownership of land parcels).
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makes clear, there are only three statutory definitions of Indian
country—reservations,
allotments,
and
dependent
Indian
189
communities. ANCSA land transferred to a tribal government would
not be a reservation or an allotment. And to be a dependent Indian
community, the land must have been set aside by the federal
government for use as Indian lands and must be under federal
superintendence.190 By itself, transferring land to a tribal government
will not satisfy these two requirements, and no amendment of ANCSA
can change this because the Supreme Court has already held the land to
be private land.191 As the Court noted, if this is to change, Congress must
modify the definition of Indian country.192 However, the prospects of
Congress amending the definition of Indian country, especially if only to
create a new form of Indian country limited to Alaska, are unlikely.
The way to “solve” the Indian country problem for land owned by
tribes is to have the land satisfy the two-part test for a dependent Indian
community. This requires setting aside the land in question under
federal supervision, which can be accomplished by the Department of
the Interior taking proposed Indian land into trust status. Until recently,
including when the ILOC Roadmap was drafted, this was prohibited by
the federal regulation controlling taking land into trust, which restricted
the applicable regulations from application in Alaska. However, as the
result of litigation by four Alaska tribes and one individual Alaska
Native challenging this regulation,193 the Department of the Interior
proposed a rule change removing this restriction on May 1, 2014.194
Taking land into trust would be on a case by case basis at the discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior.195 As of this writing, the case is on
appeal, and a stay has been entered to prevent the Secretary of the
Interior from actually taking land into trust, although she can still accept
applications.196 The rule change itself has been adopted.197
However, even assuming that Alaska tribes prevail legally on being

189. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012)).
190. Id. at 527.
191. Id. at 530.
192. Id. at 534.
193. Akiachak Native Cmty v. Salazar, 935 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2013).
This decision was based on the fact that the Alaska exclusion for trust status
impermissibly varied the privileges and immunities held by Alaska Natives
from those held by Native Americans in the Lower 48. Id. at 210–11.
194. Land Acquisitions in the State of Alaska, 79 Fed. Reg. 24,648, 24,652
(May 1, 2014) (codified at 25 C.F.R. § 151.1 (2014)).
195. Id. at 24,651.
196. Akiachak Native Cmty v. Jewell, 995 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2014).
197. 25 C.F.R. § 151.1.
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able to take land into trust, there is also the issue of actually finding land
to be taken into trust. Putting land into federal trust means taking it out
of the hands of its private owner, be it the tribe, an ANCSA or village
corporation, or an individual.198 Depending on the value of the land, this
may be no easy task. Also, regulatory and development hurdles could
arise if land is owned and managed by the federal government as
opposed to a local tribe or private corporation. And it is almost certain
that this would not be an option for every tribe in Alaska, as not every
tribe is going to occupy land that will be handed over to the federal
government for conversion into Indian country. So, while taking land
into trust may be an option for some Alaska tribes, it is not a final
answer for all.
4.

Revising VAWA to Eliminate the Alaska Exclusion

Up until late 2014, VAWA contained a provision that prevented
Alaska from enjoying the Act’s grant of expanded jurisdiction over nonIndians for many domestic violence offenses.199 Fortunately, this
offensive provision was recently repealed.200 But repeal of the Alaska
Exception to VAWA is unlikely to make a significant impact on the
prosecution of domestic violence offenders in Alaska tribal courts. As
discussed earlier,201 while VAWA extends tribal court jurisdiction to
individuals in relationships with tribal members,202 several of the
conditions it imposes are not currently feasible for many Alaska tribes.
To review: to exercise this expanded jurisdiction and hand down a
punishment that includes imprisonment, tribes are required to provide
jury trials203 before a judge who is also a licensed attorney204 using
publicly available laws and procedures,205 and to provide the defendant
with an attorney at the tribe’s expense.206 The restrictions are lessened if
imprisonment is not a potential punishment,207 but this may yield a
198. Individuals as well as tribes can give up their land to trust status. Id. In
order to be eligible for trust status, land must be unrestricted. 25 C.F.R. § 151.4.
199. S. 47, 113th Cong. § 910 (2013).
200. Repeal of Special Rule for State of Alaska, Pub. L. No. 113-275, 127 Stat.
2988 (2014) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ275/pdf/PLAW-113publ275.pdf.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 119–27.
202. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B)(iii) (2012).
203. Id. § 1304(d)(3).
204. Id. § 1304(d)(2).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id. (guaranteeing most of the rights described here only if
imprisonment is an option). Without the possibility of imprisonment, only the
right to a trial by jury remains. Id. § 1304(d)(3). However, this itself would be a
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system of justice that is weak and ineffective. Furthermore, these lesser
protections could likely already be imposed through issuing a protective
order, which is a civil remedy tribes already possess.208
Only a few Alaska tribes have publicly available laws and
procedures, and many of those do not have the extensive criminal laws,
rules of evidence, and rules of criminal procedure that seem to be
contemplated by VAWA.209 Most tribes in Alaska do not have judges
who are licensed attorneys,210 as there is an emphasis on tribal elders
being placed in adjudicatory roles.211 Tribal courts in small villages may
have trouble finding enough eligible jurors who do not have a conflict of
interest with either the offender or the victim. Moreover, tribal courts in
Alaska are often meant to be non-adversarial, where all parties can work
together to find solutions to a problem. Consequently, not only are
judges often not attorneys, but attorneys may not even be allowed to

substantial departure from the more traditional tribal courts that operate in
Alaska.
208. See Nathaniel Herz, Begich Hits Republican Rivals on Domestic Violence,
Tribal
Justice
Law,
ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS
(Aug.
16,
2014),
http://www.adn.com/article/20140816/begich-hits-republican-rivalsdomestic-violence-tribal-justice-law (noting that the repeal of the Alaska
Exemption to VAWA clarified the civil jurisdiction of Alaska tribes to issue
protective orders, but did not necessarily change anything in practice in that
regard).
209. But see, e.g., Governing Documents, CENTRAL COUNCIL TLINGIT & HAIDA
INDIAN TRIBES ALASKA, http://www.ccthita.org/government/legislative/index.
html (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (providing possibly the most complete set of
publicly available tribal codes).
210. But to say that tribal court personnel are not “legally trained” would be
incorrect. There are a variety of legal trainings available for tribal court judges
and personnel. For the past 31 years, the Tanana Chiefs Conference has held an
Annual Alaska Tribal Court Development Conference. Tribal Court Materials,
TANANA CHIEFS CONF., https://www.tananachiefs.org/get-assistance/legalresources/tribal-court-materials/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). Tribal court judges
have been invited to participate in the annul training for Alaska Court System
judges. ALASKA COURT SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013, at 23, available at
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/reports/annualrep-fy13.pdf. There is even a
Tribal Management certificate and AAS degree offered by the University of
Alaska Fairbanks Interior-Aleutians Campus, College of Rural and Community
Development, Department of Indigenous, Community and Tribal Programs. See
Tribal Management, U. ALASKA FAIRBANKS, http://uaf.edu/catalog/current/
programs/tribal_management.html#certificate (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). So
while Alaska tribal court judges generally have not attended law school, they are
often well-trained.
211. See, e.g., CENTRAL COUNCIL OF TLINGIT AND HAIDA INDIAN TRIBES OF
ALASKA, TRIBAL STATUTES § 06.02.006(E) (2015), available at http://
www.ccthita.org/government/legislative/GoverningDocs/Title_6_TribalCourt
s.pdf (“All judges of the Tribal Judicial System shall have the power . . . [t]o
request an advisory opinion from the Court of Elders regarding customary and
traditional practices or culture.”).
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argue in court.212 Because tribes in Alaska do not typically exercise
criminal jurisdiction, no tribe in Alaska provides indigent clients with an
attorney at tribal expense. Tribes in Alaska could potentially adapt to
these increased requirements, but likely only over a long period of time
and at the expense of the more culturally attuned procedures that allow
tribal courts to differentiate from state courts.
Finally, the VAWA revisions only expanded criminal jurisdiction for
tribes.213 They do not create any new forms of jurisdiction. In other
words, VAWA assumes that tribes already possess criminal jurisdiction.
If there is no existing criminal jurisdiction for tribes in Alaska, then
removing the Alaska Exception to VAWA is of little practical help. Thus,
while the repeal of the Alaska Exception is an important victory, its
effects are likely to be more symbolic than real.
5.

Congressional Affirmation of the Inherent Criminal Jurisdiction of
Alaska Tribes

As its last recommendation, the ILOC Roadmap suggests that
Congress should affirm the inherent criminal jurisdiction of Alaska
tribes over members within the boundaries of the tribe’s village.214
Because of the relative lack of Indian country in Alaska, there are no
clear external boundaries for villages by which to define and limit the
inherent land-based criminal jurisdiction to which the ILOC Roadmap
refers. It is also unclear what role Congress would play here in what is
largely a legal question. After all, if criminal jurisdiction is inherent with
tribes, then no congressional affirmation should be necessary. The ILOC
Roadmap does not explain what it means by this statement, other than
by discussing how Public Law 280 does not fit in Alaska because it
covers only Indian country, of which there is little in Alaska.215

212. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1015 (Alaska 2014) (discussing
how the rule that lawyers may not speak before the Minto tribal courts is not an
issue unless tribal remedies have yet to be exhausted); see also John v. Baker, 982
P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999) (holding that due process “in no way requires tribes
to use procedures identical to [those used in state courts]”).
213. Even if a tribe did provide all of the protections just described, it is
unclear whether they could exercise this expanded jurisdiction under VAWA
because the subsections granting criminal jurisdiction for acts of violence or
violations of protective orders require that the criminal act “occur[] in the Indian
country of the participating tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(c)(1), (c)(2)(A) (2012).
Without Indian country, Alaska tribes might still be restricted from asserting
criminal jurisdiction under VAWA. And the repeal of the Alaska Exception to
VAWA does not mend this loophole.
214. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 55.
215. Id.
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Other Proposed Solutions

Even apart from calls to revise jurisdiction, such as those found in
the ILOC Roadmap, there are efforts by various state entities to utilize
tribal courts or tribal court principles in the prosecution of criminal
offenses under state law. For example, within the past few years the
Alaska Court System has explored introducing restorative justice
principles in rural Alaska through alternate sentencing models.216 One of
these approaches involves incorporating village input into minor
criminal cases.217 While the cases are tried by a State of Alaska
Magistrate Judge, and while the State retains jurisdiction over the case,
the judge calls together members of the offender’s village to discuss the
effect of the offender’s acts on others in the community and recommend
a punishment.218 Everyone gets to speak, including the offender.219 The
judge then takes these recommendations into consideration when
issuing a sentence.220
This openness to alternate methods of sentencing has even been
recognized recently in several places in the Alaska rules. Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(i), effective April 15, 2014, allows the referral of
criminal cases, with the consent of the victim, the prosecutor, and the
defendant, to restorative justice programs such as circle sentencing, and
the inclusion of the recommendation of the program in the offender’s
sentencing agreement.221 A similar change was also made to Alaska
Delinquency Rules 21 and 23.222 There is also the possibility that the
State of Alaska will negotiate inter-tribal agreements with tribal courts
to refer certain misdemeanor criminal cases for imposition of a civil
remedy in tribal court.
These efforts are encouraging and are steps in the right direction.
But they do not satisfy the need for tribes to be able to assert their own
initial criminal jurisdiction over the same or similar criminal offenses.
Both the Alaska Court System and Department of Law initiatives
depend first upon action by a judge, prosecutor, or law enforcement

216. See Austin Baird, Alaska Courts Taking New Approach to Rural Justice,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2012), http://www.adn.com/article/
20120317/alaska-courts-take-new-approach-rural-justice (discussing the use of
circle sentencing by state court magistrates in Kake and Galena).
217. See id. (“Circle sentencing is about to be used for the first time in a felony
case . . . .”).
218. Jeff D. May, Community Justice Initiatives in the Galena District Court, 31
ALASKA JUST. F. 6, 7 (Fall 2014–Winter 2015).
219. Id. at 9–10.
220. Id.
221. Alaska R. Crim. P. 11(i) (2014).
222. Alaska Delinquency Rules 21, 23 (2014).
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officer whose resources are already being stretched thin. Then, there
needs to be a decision to refer the case to tribal court, which introduces
discretion and delay. Until tribal courts can initiate their own actions,
they will always be dependent on the good graces of others to correct
the transgressions of their own members and others who choose to
associate with their village. Even if the state initiatives described above
increase the overall available resources by bringing tribal courts into the
process, it is hard to believe that this alone will completely stem the
epidemic of alcohol and drug abuse, child abuse, sexual assault, and
other public safety issues in rural Alaska. For problems this dire, all
possible solutions need to be on the table. And that includes initial
criminal jurisdiction for Alaska tribal courts.

IV. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF ALASKA TRIBAL COURT
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Before turning to the legal justification for tribal court criminal
jurisdiction in Alaska, it is helpful to briefly review the evolution of
Alaska tribal court civil jurisdiction, as this serves as the basis for
understanding why criminal jurisdiction is also appropriate. This
history reaches its climax, though certainly not its end, with the case of
John v. Baker.223 John is the seminal case on Alaska tribal court
jurisdiction because of how it connected jurisdiction not to land, but to
people. Cases subsequent to John have built upon and expanded this
jurisdiction. Criminal jurisdiction, though, introduces concerns apart
from those that exist for civil jurisdiction, as discussed by the previous
Alaska Attorney General in response to an Indian Law and Order
Commission Report (“ILOC Roadmap”).224 After reviewing the general
history of civil jurisdiction for Alaska tribes, these more specific
concerns will be explored by digging even deeper into John. What will
emerge is a criminal jurisdiction sufficiently limited to avoid the charge
of boundlessness leveled against it by the former Attorney General and
others, but one which still gives tribes sufficient legal authority to
engage in criminal prosecutions.

223. 982 P.2d 738 (Alaska 1999).
224. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24. See generally Letter from Michael C.
Geraghty, Att’y Gen., State of Alaska, to Troy Eid, Chairman, Indian Law and
Order Comm’n (Feb. 1, 2013), reprinted in ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at app.
G, 233 [hereinafter Geraghty Letter] (discussing how the concept of creating
tribal criminal jurisdiction on certain remote parcels does not make sense, and
that such expansion will create more problems than it will solve). The positions
of the current Alaska Attorney General on these issues are, as of this writing,
unclear.
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John v. Baker and Member-Based Jurisdiction

Since the passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA),225 there has been a long series of cases debating the
jurisdiction of tribal courts in Alaska, primarily surrounding child
custody and welfare cases, including those arising from the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA).226 Initially, state courts held that tribal courts did
not have jurisdiction to decide a petition declaring an Indian child to be
in need of aid because the tribe had not been federally recognized.227
This confusion over tribal recognition also arose with regard to
recognition of tribal court adoptions when the Ninth Circuit upheld the
ability of tribal courts in Alaska to have concurrent jurisdiction with
state courts over ICWA cases,228 but remanded for a determination of
whether the tribes involved in the suit were in fact sovereign.229 This
confusion over federal recognition was resolved in the early 1990s, first
with a list put out by the Department of the Interior in 1993 recognizing
the Alaska villages specified in ANCSA as tribes,230 and then the
following year with the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of

225. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012).
226. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963. ICWA was passed by Congress in 1978 to
counteract a long history of Indian children being taken from their homes and
being placed for foster care or adoption with non-Indian families. Id. § 1901.
ICWA applies only to foster care and termination of parental rights proceedings
and not to custody disputes between parents. It contains several provisions
aimed at preserving Indian families, such as setting heightened evidentiary
standards for removing Indian children from them. Id. § 1912(e)–(f). If children
are removed, there are “placement preferences” that require, absent a showing of
good cause to the contrary, that Indian children be placed with members of their
extended family or with other Indian families. Id. § 1915(a)–(b). Tribal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over foster placement and termination proceedings
for children that reside on reservations, but even for Indian children who do not
live on a reservation, foster placement and termination proceedings can be
transferred to tribal court unless one of the parents objects. Id. § 1911(a)–(b). For
foster placement or termination proceedings in state court, the Indian child’s
tribe must be allowed to intervene. Id. § 1911(c). Federal and state courts are
required to recognize tribal court decisions. Id. § 1911(d).
227. Native Vill. of Nenana v. State, Dep’t. of Health & Social Servs., 722 P.2d
219, 221 (Alaska 1986).
228. Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 555–56 (9th
Cir. 1991).
229. Id. at 562.
230. CASE & VOLUCK supra note 76, at 327, 426 (referencing 58 Fed. Reg.
54,364, 54,368 (Oct. 21, 1993)). The list, sometimes known as the Ada Deer List
for the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs who published the list, originally
included 227 Alaska tribes; it has since been expanded to 230 tribes. Id. All of the
villages recognized by ANCSA were federally recognized as tribes, though no
ANCSA corporations themselves were recognized as tribes. Id. at 327.
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1994 (“Tribe List Act”).231
However, the federal recognition of Alaska tribes still left
unresolved the question of whether these tribes could exercise
jurisdiction and the basis for that jurisdiction. After the decision in
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,232 229 federally
recognized tribes in Alaska were left without a land base or defined
boundaries over which to exercise jurisdiction.233 ANCSA explicitly
extinguished pre-existing land claims and all assertions of aboriginal
title.234 Yet, tribal courts in Alaska still continued to operate and issue
decisions on a variety of custody and other cases.
This was the situation that faced the Alaska Supreme Court in John.
The seminal case in establishing tribal court jurisdiction over civil
matters in Alaska, John addressed whether a tribe had inherent
sovereignty to hear a custody case between tribal members in its courts
outside of Indian country.235 The case differed from earlier federal cases
because it involved an action between two parents, rather than a foster
care placement or termination issue, and therefore the jurisdictional
pronouncements of ICWA did not directly apply.236
Without the existence of Indian country or the applicability of
ICWA, the Alaska Supreme Court based Alaska tribal court jurisdiction
on the central role that regulating domestic relationships among
members plays in exercising tribal sovereignty.237 In essence, jurisdiction
rested not just with land, but could also be derived from a tribe’s
existence as a federally-recognized sovereign with powers over its tribal
members.238 This inherent sovereignty was retained in tribes by nature
of being sovereign unless and until removed by Congress.239 Finding no
such divestiture of power, the court concluded that “federal tribes
derive the power to adjudicate internal domestic matters, including

231. Pub. L. No. 103-454, 108 Stat. 4791 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 479a).
232. 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 169–75.
234. See supra text accompanying note 173.
235. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 743 (Alaska 1999). The case arose because a
father in a child custody dispute failed to inform the Alaska state court of a
previous tribal court order granting shared custody. Id.
236. Id. at 747.
237. Id. at 758.
238. See id. at 759 (“Decisions of the United States Supreme Court support the
conclusion that Native American nations may possess the authority to govern
themselves even when they do not occupy Indian country.”).
239. See id. at 751 (“Modern tribal sovereignty . . . ‘exists only at the
sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress
acts, . . . Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
status.’”(quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978))).
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child custody disputes over tribal children, from a source of sovereignty
independent of the land they occupy.”240
Closely connected with the concept of inherent sovereignty is the
adjudication of the internal affairs of members of the tribe. Indeed, the
key inquiry for determining jurisdiction “is not whether the tribe is
located in Indian country, but rather whether the tribe needs jurisdiction
over a given context to secure tribal self-governance.”241 Drawing upon
a series of United States Supreme Court cases regarding tribal civil
jurisdiction, the court in John noted that tribes “have power to make
their own substantive law in internal matters, and to enforce that law in
their own forums.”242 The court further held that requiring Alaska tribes
to possess Indian country “to exercise the same inherent and delegated
authorities available to other tribes” would render the federal
recognition of Alaska tribes essentially meaningless and the Tribe List
Act hollow.243
However, the court noted that because of the lack of Indian
country, tribal courts in Alaska do not have exclusive jurisdiction over
custody cases and instead have concurrent jurisdiction with state
courts.244 But, importantly, the court also held under the principle of
comity that when a tribal court does issue a custody order, Alaska state
courts should generally give recognition and legal effect to that
decision.245 “Comity is the principle that ‘the courts of one state or
jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another
state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference
and mutual respect.’”246
There are limited circumstances in which a state court is not to
recognize the decision of a tribal court. One, understandably, is where
the tribe lacks either subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the
case.247 The other is where there is reason to believe that the due process

240. Id. at 754.
241. Id. at 756.
242. Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1978)).
243. Id. at 753 (quoting Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive
Services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,364,
54,366 (Oct. 21, 1993)).
244. Id. at 759.
245. Id. at 763. In ICWA cases, the full-faith-and-credit doctrine applies to
state recognition of tribal court decisions. Id. at 762. However, because the
custody case at issue in John did not fall under ICWA, a comity analysis was
necessary. Id. at 761.
246. Id. at 762 (quoting Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz.
App. 1977)).
247. Id. at 763.
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rights of the litigant were denied by the tribal court.248 As part of any
due process analysis when deciding whether to grant comity, the state
court is to look at: (1) “whether the parties received notice of the [tribal
court] proceedings,” (2) whether the parties were granted “a full and fair
opportunity to be heard,” (3) whether the tribal court judges were
impartial, and (4) whether the proceedings were conducted in a regular
fashion.249 The tribal court procedures need not be identical to those of
state courts,250 and state court judges should “respect the cultural
differences that influence tribal jurisprudence, as well as recognize the
practical limits experienced by smaller court systems.”251 Moreover, a
judge cannot deny comity simply because she or he disagrees with the
tribal court decision.252
John thus recognized the inherent sovereignty of tribal courts in
Alaska by finding an alternate basis for jurisdiction other than land—the
members of the tribes themselves. Vital to the survival of tribes was the
ability to govern internal relations among its members. And, through
the comity analysis, tribal courts were elevated to co-equal courts with
Alaska state courts.
Subsequent cases from the Alaska Supreme Court have reinforced
the independent status of tribal courts. For example, the court has held
that ICWA allows the transfer of child custody cases from state to tribal
court regardless of whether the tribe had sought to reassume jurisdiction
under ICWA,253 and that the resulting tribal court decisions are entitled
to full faith and credit by state courts and agencies.254 The Alaska
Supreme Court has also held that tribes possess sovereign immunity
despite not having a land-base.255 And the court has held that tribal
appellate processes need to be exhausted before litigants in tribal court
can bring the case in state court.256 These decisions were made by
drawing on the member-based jurisdiction endorsed by John and in full
recognition of a lack of territorial jurisdiction.

248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 763–64.
253. In re C.R.H., 29 P.3d 849, 852 (Alaska 2001).
254. State v. Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 751 (Alaska 2011). The court
also held in Native Village of Tanana that tribes have concurrent jurisdiction over
ICWA-defined child custody proceedings independent of the existence of Indian
country. Id.
255. McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Vill., 265 P.3d 337, 340–41 (Alaska 2011).
256. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1011 (Alaska 2014) (denying
recourse to state court where a litigant in an ICWA proceeding in tribal court
had not appealed to the tribal appellate court).
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The Argument for Alaska Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction

The dissent in John suggested that the logical extension of the
Court’s decision was to grant Alaska tribes “authority to criminally
punish tribal members.”257 This Article agrees with this logical
extension.258 However, this argument, of course, requires further
elaboration.
In order to establish tribal court jurisdiction over criminal cases,
two things need to be established: subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction.259 Indeed, when John discussed the comity
doctrine, it held that “our courts should refrain from enforcing tribal
court judgments if the tribal court lacked personal or subject matter
jurisdiction.”260 Subject matter jurisdiction pertains to whether Alaska
tribal courts have the “legal authority to hear and decide a particular
type of case.”261 Personal jurisdiction pertains to the ability of the court
to hear a case involving a particular party.262 Unlike with subject matter
jurisdiction, the lack of which can be an absolute bar to a court hearing a
case, personal jurisdiction can be acquired by waiver or consent of the
defendant.263
1.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The notion that Alaska tribes do not have subject matter
jurisdiction over criminal cases is based on the false premise that the
tribes must affirmatively prove this jurisdiction. What John and the
257. John, 982 P.2d at 781 (Matthews, J., dissenting). The dissent further
suggests that the majority would not want to go this far. Id. The majority opinion
did not respond to this invitation.
258. But see id. (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984)) (using Solem,
which declined to extend tribal court jurisdiction over a tribal member for a
crime committed off a reservation, to argue against the extension). The dissent,
however, overinterprets Solem. The issue in Solem was whether land that had
been opened to settlement by non-Indians still existed within reservation
boundaries for the purpose of establishing federal jurisdiction (as opposed to
state jurisdiction) over the alleged criminal act. Solem, 465 U.S. at 465. While the
Court held that States have jurisdiction over land that has been removed from
reservation boundaries, the case says nothing about foreclosing a theory of
member-based jurisdiction. Id. at 467.
259. Barlow v. Thompson, 221 P.3d 998, 1002 (Alaska 2009) (citing Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Nw. Med. Imaging, Inc. v. State,
Dep’t of Revenue, 151 P.3d 434, 438 (Alaska 2006)).
260. John, 982 P.2d at 763 (citing Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 810
(9th Cir. 1997)).
261. Nw. Med. Imaging, Inc., 151 P.3d at 438 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 257 (3d ed. 1999))
262. Kuk v. Nalley, 166 P.3d 47, 51 (Alaska 2007).
263. Fletcher v. State, 258 P.3d 874, 877 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
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plethora of other cases already examined uniformly show is that Alaska
tribes, as federally recognized tribes, have inherent sovereignty over all
areas of governance not removed by the federal government. This
means that the burden is not on Alaska tribes to demonstrate the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases but on those
who would argue against it to show that criminal jurisdiction has been
removed. And because John based tribal jurisdiction in Alaska on tribal
membership as opposed to land, that member-based jurisdiction extends
to criminal cases as well. Since this is not a universally accepted
proposition, however, it is worth expanding upon.
a.

The History of United States Supreme Court Cases Recognizes
that Criminal Jurisdiction is Derived from Tribal Membership

The history of tribal criminal jurisdiction has consistently related
more to membership than to land. The “doctrine of discovery” and
diminishing of Indian land rights to aboriginal title in Johnson v.
M’Intosh,264 along with the notion of tribes as “domestic dependent
nations” in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,265 begin the divestiture of tribal
rights from a necessary connection to a land base. Worcester v. Georgia266
laid the foundation for the inherent sovereignty of tribes.267 A more
direct application to criminal jurisdiction came in Ex Parte Crow Dog,268
which affirmed that tribes retained jurisdiction over criminal offenses
between members when that jurisdiction had not been removed by
Congress.269 While Crow Dog did not turn on the issue of the removal or
non-removal of land from federal jurisdiction,270 it affirmed that tribes
retain criminal jurisdiction as part of their inherent sovereignty.
Notably, the Court expounded upon the virtues of keeping criminal
jurisdiction within tribes for crimes between Indians by discussing the
importance of being heard by a jury of one’s peers within the same
culture and traditions in which the offender operates.271

264. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
265. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
266. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
267. See id. at 518 (determining that the Treaty of Hopewell’s use of the term
“hunting ground” in describing boundaries did not manifest intent to restrict
full use of lands reserved to the Cherokee tribe).
268. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 101–05.
270. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 570.
271. Id. at 571. In full, the Court said:
It is a case of life and death. It is a case where, against an express
exception in the law itself, that law, by argument and inference only, is
sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the members of a
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Two more Supreme Court cases further developed and affirmed, at
least implicitly, that criminal jurisdiction for tribal courts rests with
people and not land. In the 1978 case of United States v. Wheeler,272 the
Court held that an individual who had already been convicted of a
crime in tribal court did not face double jeopardy when charged in
federal court for a crime arising out of the same events.273 The Court
reached this conclusion by holding that tribes did not exercise criminal
jurisdiction as an extension of the federal government but rather
through their own inherent sovereignty:
It is undisputed that Indian tribes have power to enforce their
criminal laws against tribe members. Although physically
within the territory of the United States and subject to ultimate
federal control, they nonetheless remain “a separate people,
with the power of regulating their internal and social
relations.” Their right of internal self-government includes the
right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to
enforce those laws by criminal sanctions.274
By holding that “an Indian tribe’s power to punish tribal offenders
is part of its own retained sovereignty,” the Court recognized that
criminal jurisdiction over tribal members predated the creating of the

community, separated by race, by tradition, by the instincts of a free
though savage life, from the authority and power which seeks to
impose upon them the restraints of an external and unknown code, and
to subject them to the responsibilities of civil conduct, according to
rules and penalties of which they could have no previous warning;
which judges them by a standard made by others, and not for them,
which takes no account of the conditions which should except them
from its exactions, and makes no allowance for their inability to
understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different
race, according to the law of a social state of which they have an
imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their
history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their
savage nature; one which measures the red man’s revenge by the
maxims of the white man’s morality.
Id. (emphasis added). Though unquestionably paternalistic, the emphasis on
cultural differences serves as a common justification for tribal courts today. See,
e.g., John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 760 (Alaska 1999) (“[B]arriers of culture,
geography, and language combine to create a judicial system that remains
foreign and inaccessible to many Alaska Natives. These differences have created
problems in administering a unified justice system sensitive to the needs of
Alaska’s various cultures.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
272. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
273. Id. at 315–16.
274. Id. at 322 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886))
(internal citations omitted).
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reservation system and thus any reliance on land or territorial
restrictions.275 Though domestic dependent nations, tribes have not
forfeited, and Congress has not taken away, tribal authority to govern
internal relations, and those internal relations include criminal
offenses.276
The other key case from 1978 is Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe,277 which held that tribes do not have jurisdiction to prosecute
crimes committed by non-members on reservations.278 At virtually the
same time it affirmed the inherent sovereignty of tribes,279 the Court also
held that “[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try nonIndian citizens of the United States except in a manner acceptable to
Congress.”280 If sovereignty were derived from a tribe’s land base, then
there would be no sound basis for distinguishing between Indian and
non-Indian offenders—the tribe that controlled the land could exercise
criminal jurisdiction over all those who came on the land. That is how
sovereignty normally works. But by holding that tribes did not have
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court rested criminal jurisdiction on
people rather than on land.
The Court further extended this principle in Duro v. Reina,281
holding that not only could a tribe not exercise jurisdiction over a nonIndian, it could not even exercise jurisdiction over Indians who were not
members of that tribe.282 Once Oliphant is accepted as good law, the
conclusion in Duro follows quite logically. If tribal criminal jurisdiction
is based on and justified by internal self-governance, then this
jurisdiction should be limited to tribal members.283 Central to this
conclusion was the political connection between members of a tribe and
the tribal government that passed and enforced the criminal laws under
which the member could be prosecuted.284 The Court also recognized
the importance of cultural differences between tribes in holding that
members of one tribe do not necessarily consent to the authority of

275. Id. at 328.
276. Id. at 323.
277. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 112–18.
279. Oliphant and Wheeler were both argued in January and decided in March
of 1978, though the decision in Oliphant preceded the decision in Wheeler by
about two weeks.
280. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210.
281. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012), as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
282. Id. at 688.
283. Id. at 686. The Court did not apply this limit to civil cases. Id. at 687.
284. Id. at 693.

ARTICLE 3 - FORTSON (DO NOT DELETE)

136

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/18/2015 2:05 PM

Vol. 32:1

another tribe simply by virtue of being Indian.285 In response to the
objection that its holding would result in an inability to prosecute nonIndians for non-major crimes committed on reservations, the Court
noted that this was up to Congress to fix.286
The underlying principle behind Duro, though, is that criminal
jurisdiction for tribes is based upon membership, not on any connection
to land. If land were the primary and only determining factor for
criminal jurisdiction, or even if it were a substantial factor, then the
decision in Duro would not make sense. Congress did effectively
overturn Duro in what is commonly known as “the Duro fix” by
amending the powers of self-government possessed by Indian tribes to
include “criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”287 Nothing in this statute
limited this criminal jurisdiction to Indian country. The ability of
Congress to determine the inherent powers of tribes was upheld in
United States v. Lara.288 Importantly, the Court found this not to be a
delegation of federal authority into tribal affairs, which effectively
would have brought tribal courts under federal jurisdiction and
reinstated double jeopardy.289 Rather, the Court in Lara affirmed the
reliance upon a tribe’s inherent sovereignty as a source of criminal
jurisdiction in the cases just discussed.290
b.

Membership-Based Criminal Jurisdiction is Required by John
v. Baker

Though focused on a family law dispute, the inherent sovereignty
of Alaska tribes endorsed by the Alaska Supreme Court in John both
rests upon and is consistent with an extension of this sovereignty to
criminal jurisdiction. If Alaska tribes possessed Indian country, they
would be in the same position as tribes from the Lower 48 and their
jurisdiction over either family law or criminal cases would not be in
question. But because of the relative lack of Indian country, John had to
determine whether tribal jurisdiction was based on land or on people.
The court recognized that the majority of cases from outside of Alaska
285. See id. at 695 (“But the tribes are not mere fungible groups of
homogenous persons among whom any Indian would feel at home. On the
contrary, wide variations in customs, art, language, and physical characteristics
separate the tribes, and their history has been marked by both intertribal
alliances and animosities.”).
286. Id. at 698.
287. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012).
288. 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
289. Id. at 197, 207.
290. Id. at 205–06. See generally Leonhard, supra note 117 (describing this legal
history in more detail).
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assume the existence of reservations,291 but that the core principles
behind these cases create a system of dual sovereignty where a tribe’s
authority can be derived not only from the land but also from the tribe’s
members.292
In reaching this conclusion, the Court drew upon Wheeler, quoting
at length from the case to support the notion that “‘the powers of selfgovernment, including the power to prescribe and enforce internal
criminal laws . . . involve only the relations among members of a tribe.
Thus, they are not such powers as would necessarily be lost by virtue of
a tribe’s dependent status.’”293 The Court also relied upon Montana v.
United States294 and Duro to emphasize the “fundamental importance of
membership” in determining jurisdiction.295 Other cases that were relied
upon more directly discuss civil jurisdiction, including over domestic
relations.296 At the heart of the Court’s reasoning is a focus not on land
but on whether the jurisdiction at issue is intertwined with the tribe’s
inherent powers of self-governance.297
Self-governance in John meant jurisdiction over custody disputes
between parents, based on the notion that the ability to determine tribal
membership and regulate domestic relations among members “lies at
the core of sovereignty.”298 But there is no indication in John that
member-based jurisdiction is limited to domestic relations. And nor
should there be. Furthermore, the Court’s reliance upon criminal law
cases (Wheeler and Duro) in building its argument for member-based
sovereignty suggests that the Court’s view of sovereignty extends
beyond domestic relations alone. Throughout its discussion of memberbased sovereignty, the Court repeatedly emphasizes that the
determination of tribal authority depends on whether the power at issue
pertains to the tribe’s “sovereign power to regulate the internal affairs of
its members.”299
Where tribes in rural Alaska face an epidemic of unrestrained

291. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska 1999).
292. Id. at 754–55.
293. Id. at 755 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
294. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
295. John, 982 P.2d at 755.
296. Id. at 756–57 (citing and discussing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 55–56 (1978); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 389–90 (1976)).
297. Id. at 756, 759.
298. Id. at 758.
299. Id. at 759. Basing jurisdiction on membership as opposed purely to
territory has been compared to the power of governments to regulate the
conduct of its citizens even when those citizens are in foreign countries. See
NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 220 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402–403 (1987)).
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domestic violence, wanton sexual assault of adults and children, and
largely unchecked drug and alcohol abuse; where Alaska Native women
experience 47.2% of the domestic violence in the state while comprising
only 17.7% of the population;300 where substance abuse is a factor in 81%
of reports of harm committed by Alaska Natives;301 where 42.7% of
minors ages 12 to 17, including those in rural areas, are at risk of having
five or more alcoholic drinks a week, and where 5.4% suffer from
alcohol dependence or abuse;302 where an Alaska Native woman is
sexually assaulted every 18 hours;303 and where at least 75 rural
communities lack any resident law enforcement presence304—criminal
jurisdiction is crucial to the internal affairs and self-governance that lies
at the heart of tribal sovereignty. If tribal subject-matter jurisdiction
derives from tribal membership and not a necessary connection to land,
then the inherent sovereignty that Lower 48 tribes have for criminal
jurisdiction over their own members must also exist for Alaska tribes.
The other key holding of John that supports the recognition that
tribal courts in Alaska have criminal jurisdiction is the principle that
tribes in Alaska retain all of their sovereign power unless removed by
Congress.305 While acknowledging that tribal sovereignty is not
absolute, “Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute.”306 Indeed, the majority in John explicitly
rejected the dissent’s argument that outside of reservation boundaries
tribes only possess those powers directly given by Congress.307 In other
words, Alaska tribes need not seek congressional approval for exercise
of their sovereign powers. Because adjudication of criminal matters lies
within a tribe’s sovereign authority and has throughout the history of
Indian law jurisprudence, and because this authority has not been

300. Rivera et al., supra note 2; ALASKA BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, supra note
3. Research Unit of the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Alaska Bureau of Vital Statistics
2005 Annual Report, ALASKA DEP’T HEALTH & SOC. SERVS., DIV. PUB. HEALTH 215
(2005).
301. Alaska Rural Justice & Law Enforcement Comm’n, supra note 33.
302. 2008-2009 NSDUH State Estimates of Substance Use and Mental Disorders,
supra note 44.
303. Alaska Safe Families and Villages Act of 2014, S. 1474, 113th Cong. §
2(a)(3) (as introduced in Senate, Aug. 1, 2013), available at https://
www.congress.gov/113/bills/s1474/BILLS-113s1474is.pdf (enacted without
relevant language as Repeal of Special Rule for State of Alaska, Pub. L. No. 113275, 128 Stat. 2988 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2265), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-113publ275/pdf/PLAW-113publ275.pdf).
304. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 39.
305. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 751 (Alaska 1999).
306. Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
307. Id. at 751–52.
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divested by Congress,308 Alaska tribes retain criminal jurisdiction over
their members as part of their authority to self-govern internal affairs.
c.

None of the Common Legal Critiques of Criminal Jurisdiction
for Alaska Tribes are Legitimate

In responding to the ILOC Roadmap, the State of Alaska made
several legal arguments against extending criminal jurisdiction “off
reservation” to Alaska tribes.309 None of these arguments are legally
sound or sufficient to deny the recognition of criminal jurisdiction for
Alaska tribes.310
The State objected to what it calls “a backdoor attempt . . . to
redefine Indian country.”311 However, a redefinition would be precisely
the opposite of what recognition of tribal-member-based criminal
jurisdiction actually accomplishes. An attempt to “redefine Indian
country” would assume that jurisdiction is necessarily tied to land,
which is one of the flaws in the recommendations of the ILOC
Roadmap.312 But as just shown, tribes in Alaska have subject matter
jurisdiction over criminal matters independent of whether or not they
possess a land base. No redefinition of Indian country is therefore
sought or necessary to give Alaska tribes jurisdiction over criminal
offenses.
The State further objects by arguing that expanding tribal
jurisdiction outside of reservation boundaries would “mark a
fundamental shift in Indian law jurisprudence” because geographic
location determines sovereignty for criminal cases.313 To be sure,
member-based criminal jurisdiction would be a novel development in

308. The State’s arguments asserting that criminal jurisdiction has been
divested by congressional action will be addressed in the next Subsection.
309. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 238.
310. With a change in administration in 2014, the State has released a
transition report emphasizing the public safety challenges in rural Alaska and
signaling greater openness to working with tribal courts to address these issues.
Pub. Safety Transition Working Grp., Public Safety, STATE OF ALASKA 1–2,
http://gov.alaska.gov/Walker_media/transition_page/public-safety_final.pdf
(last visited Feb. 12, 2015). It remains to be seen, though, how this will play out,
and the transition report does not address the issue of tribal court criminal
jurisdiction separately from discussing referral of cases from state to tribal
courts. Even if the new administration and Attorney General does not adopt all
of the same arguments, these arguments are likely to be introduced in some
form in any lawsuit challenging tribal court criminal jurisdiction in Alaska and
are therefore worth addressing preemptively here.
311. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 239.
312. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 51–55.
313. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 238.
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Indian law jurisprudence.314 But so was member-based jurisdiction for
domestic relations in Alaska under John.315 And just like with domestic
relations, the long history of federal case law supports the conclusion
that criminal jurisdiction can be derived from membership as well as
from land.
The State also asserts that it has exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
covered by the Indian Country Crimes Act316 and the Indian Major
Crimes Act317 under Public Law 280.318 This argument is flawed for
several reasons. Both the Indian Country Crimes Act and the Indian
Major Crimes Act require the existence of Indian country for their
jurisdictional provisions to take effect.319 For that matter, so does Public
Law 280.320 The Alaska Supreme Court, however, has held that Public
Law 280 for the most part does not apply in Alaska because of the
relative lack of Indian country.321 Moreover, even if Public Law 280 did
apply, it would not strip tribes of their inherent jurisdiction,322 which as
just seen includes criminal jurisdiction. At most it would create
concurrent jurisdiction, which essentially already exists. Thus, the
State’s arguments here are inapplicable and unavailing.
The State contends that granting criminal jurisdiction to each of
Alaska’s 230 separate tribes “would create a confusing patchwork quilt
of jurisdiction, undermine the clarity of the current system, and
complicate the State’s ability to police its own territory.”323 It is almost as
if the State assumes that some tribes will have bizarre criminal laws
making crossing your arms a criminal offense. Tribes are restricted to
enforcing their own tribal criminal code, but this makes them no
different than tribes with reservations. To be sure, tribes in Alaska

314. In Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), the Court did hold that states
possess criminal jurisdiction for crimes committed off the reservation, id. at 363,
but it has never held that this jurisdiction is exclusive.
315. See Simonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1008 (Alaska 2014) (“The tribal
sovereignty to decide cases involving the best interests of tribal children
recognized in John is inherent, non-territorial sovereignty.” (emphasis added)).
316. Act of Mar. 27, 1854 ch. 26 § 3, 10 Stat. 269, 270.
317. Ch. 341 § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1887) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (2012)).
318. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162,
1360); Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 238–39.
319. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153(a) (2012).
320. Id. § 1162(a).
321. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 748 (Alaska 1999).
322. See NEWTON ET AL., supra note 89, at 555 (“The nearly unanimous
view . . . is that Public Law 280 left inherent civil and criminal jurisdiction of
Indian nations untouched.”).
323. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 240.
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would be enforcing tribal law and not state law.324 This is a consistent
and necessary condition for double jeopardy not applying. Indeed, it is
worth keeping in mind that tribal court jurisdiction supplements and
does not replace state jurisdiction over criminal offenses, thus enhancing
rather than complicating the State’s law enforcement capabilities.325 The
ability to adjudicate criminal matters may require many Alaska tribes—
which to date have not taken advantage of this aspect of their inherent
sovereignty—to develop criminal codes.326 However, there is no reason
to believe that these codes will not be modelled on state laws to address
the same public safety violations. Assault and illegal use of alcohol or
drugs are likely to be criminal offenses under tribal law just as they
would under state law.
The State notes that many villages have large non-Native
populations that will complicate enforcement and contends that
offenders may receive different criminal punishments depending on
their race.327 That non-Indians cannot be tried by tribal courts is well
established,328 and seemingly acknowledged by the State. Rather, tribal
court criminal jurisdiction is limited to members of federally recognized
tribes.329 Essentially, the State is making an implicit equal protection
argument. But this argument has been explicitly rejected on multiple
occasions—being an Indian and belonging to a tribe is a political
classification, not a racial one.330 By extension, this also addresses the
324. Potentially, the State could cross-deputize tribal police officers, which
would allow those officers to enforce state law. Some have advocated for a form
of cross-deputization for many years. E.g., Justin Roberts, Improving Public Safety
in Rural Alaska: A Review of Past Studies, ALASKA JUST. F. 1, 8 (Winter 2005); ILOC
Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 50.
325. The State complains that there is “no double jeopardy prohibition in
Alaska law.” Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 240. It is unclear why the
State thinks there needs to be this prohibition. The legal nature of double
jeopardy is clearly established, and the State would have discretion not to
prosecute if there was a concurrent tribal prosecution occurring.
326. Those tribes that decide to exercise criminal jurisdiction will also need to
develop the enforcement mechanisms, beyond just tribal courts, to support a
criminal justice system. This may prove a daunting task, given the remoteness of
many tribes and limited financial resources. Lack of adequate funding for tribal
criminal justice efforts is a common point raised in reports on the status of rural
Alaska Natives. E.g., ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch. 2, at 50; Att’y Gen.’s
Advisory Comm. on Am. Indian & Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence,
supra note 24, at 140. Remedying this problem, though, is beyond the scope of
this article.
327. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 240.
328. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978).
329. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), (4) (2012). Thus, Alaska tribes could prosecute
Alaska Natives who are members of other tribes but who commit criminal
offenses within the jurisdiction of that tribe.
330. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (“A
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implicit argument of needing to consent to and participate in the laws
and governance of a tribe to be subject to its jurisdiction. That Alaska
tribes may not be able to prosecute non-Natives is certainly a problem,
as the State may assume that the existence of a tribal court absolves it of
all responsibility, leaving non-Native offenders unprosecuted. But this is
hardly a justification for preventing tribal jurisdiction entirely. The State
already has an obligation to enforce state laws, and this obligation
would continue to exist for both non-Natives and Natives alike. Alaska
tribes would enforce tribal criminal law as a complement to state law. A
policy by the State not to enforce state law against non-Natives merely
because of the existence of possible alternate forms of prosecution
would be racist, hypocritical, and politically disastrous. The point of
extending criminal jurisdiction to Alaska tribes is to provide more tools
for combatting social ills, even if those tools are not as broad as they
should be because of Congress’s unwillingness to fix the jurisdictional
limitations of Oliphant.331
The State expresses concern that “individuals would be subjected
to tribal criminal prosecution and significantly different due process
standards without any notice or consent.”332 But as with its other
arguments, the State’s fears here are without solid legal foundation. The
Alaska Supreme Court has repeatedly held, including in John, that in
order for a tribal court order to be recognized by an Alaska court the
tribal court must grant certain due process protections, namely notice
and the opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal conducting
regular proceedings.333 Where due process is not followed in tribal court,
Alaska courts will not recognize the tribal court decision.334 Differences
in procedures in tribal courts should absolutely be expected, considering
the cultural differences of the tribe and the practical limitations of being

tribe’s right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.”
(emphasis added)).
331. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 212 (“Finally, we are not unaware of the
prevalence of non-Indian crime on today’s reservations which the tribes
forcefully argue requires the ability to try non-Indians. But these are
considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should
finally be authorized to try non-Indians.” (citations omitted)). See also PEVAR,
supra note 90, at 132 (discussing the need for an “Oliphant fix” to address the
high crime rates in Indian country).
332. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 240.
333. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999); see also Simmonds v.
Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1015–16 (Alaska 2014).
334. See, e.g., Starr v. George, 175 P.3d 50, 55–56 (Alaska 2008) (refusing to
recognize tribal court adoption proceedings where the failure to provide notice
to the grandparents violated their due process rights).
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a small court in a remote location.335 But all that this means is that due
process may be different in tribal courts than state courts, not that it does
not exist. As the court in John wrote, “we would ignore the fundamental
meaning of sovereignty and insult tribal systems of justice to reason that
because tribal law is different it is inferior.”336
In addition to due process protections, tribal courts hearing
criminal cases would also be bound by the restrictions of the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA),337 which the State acknowledges in its response
to the ILOC Roadmap.338 ICRA, which applies to all Indians
independent of the presence of Indian country,339 places limits on the
sentences that tribal courts can impose340 and provides to criminal
defendants in tribal courts some of the protections found in the Bill of
Rights.341 ICRA also guarantees the right of habeas corpus if a defendant
wants to challenge the sentence handed down by a tribal court on due
process, or certain other, grounds.342 Rather than viewing ICRA as a
welcome safeguard, however, the State chooses to interpret the
limitations as a blow to tribal court jurisdiction,343 possibly because the
State incorrectly presumes that tribes would have exclusive jurisdiction
over criminal matters. The limitations on tribal court jurisdiction
imposed by ICRA may result in a restriction on the severity of cases that
a tribal court would or could hear. But again, this is not a justification for
denying all criminal jurisdiction to Alaska tribes. The situation in rural
Alaska is dire enough that every potential source of criminal justice
should be valued and embraced.
Finally, the State objects to the lack of clear boundaries to
determine the extent of tribal criminal jurisdiction.344 How to place

335. John, 982 P.2d at 763.
336. Id. at 764.
337. U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (2012).
338. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 239.
339. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
340. Id. § 1302(a)(7)(c).
341. See id. §§ 1302(a)(2)–(4), (6)–(8), (10) (guaranteeing many of the
protections contained within the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution). Criminal
proceedings in which the defendant may be subject to imprisonment by more
than a year create additional requirements for the tribal court, such as that the
defendant be provided with assistance of counsel at tribal expense, id. §§
1302(c)(1), (2), that the judge be licensed to practice law, id. § 1302(c)(3)(B), that
the tribe have publicly available criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules of
criminal procedure, id. § 1302(c)(4), and that a recording of the proceedings be
kept, id. § 1302(c)(5).
342. Id. § 1303.
343. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 239.
344. Geraghty Letter, supra note 224, at app. G, 240.
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limits on the reach of tribal court jurisdiction in the absence of
reservation or other land-based borders is indeed a challenging topic.
However, it is an issue not of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather of
personal jurisdiction, to which this Article now turns.
2.

Personal Jurisdiction

At first glance, it seems as if member-based jurisdiction would
result in boundless criminal jurisdiction for tribes over their members.
Conversely, one might fear never really knowing when one became
subject to a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction. Upon further examination,
though, John and common sense provide an answer to these concerns.345
Though it did not address the issue extensively, the court in John
stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction “ensures that the
tribal court will not be called upon to adjudicate the disputes of parents
and children who live far from their tribal villages and have little or no
contact with those villages.”346 This notion of “minimum contacts” is a
common requirement when establishing personal jurisdiction, though
primarily in civil cases. Drawing upon International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,347 the court has elsewhere held that “minimum contacts” for
the purpose of satisfying due process is met where maintaining suit in
the forum asserting personal jurisdiction “does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”348 The court further held
that exercise of jurisdiction is justified “by the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation” when the controversy at issue
“is ‘related to’ or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contacts with the forum
state.”349 Where an individual invokes the benefits and protections of a
forum’s laws, he or she has submitted to the forum’s jurisdiction.350
The main principle here is that personal jurisdiction derives from
submitting to and deriving benefit from a government. In the case of
criminal jurisdiction, this is normally tied to the offense occurring within
a territory.351 But it can be translated to member-based jurisdiction as

345. Admittedly, this answer also ties into the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction in that it touches on the types of cases that tribal courts can hear.
However, when tribal jurisdiction is based on membership and not land, this
overlap is to be expected.
346. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 763 (Alaska 1999).
347. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
348. In re Estate of Fields, 219 P.3d 995, 1008 (Alaska 2009) (quoting Int’l Shoe
Co., 326 U.S. at 316).
349. Id. at 1009 (quoting Glover v. W. Air Lines, Inc., 745 P.2d 1365, 1367
(Alaska 1987)).
350. S.B. v. State, Dep’t. of Health & Soc. Servs., 61 P.3d 6, 14 (Alaska 2002).
351. James L. Buchwalter, Criminal Jurisdiction of Municipal or Other Local
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well. Tribes can only exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses that
occur within the traditional village over which the tribe governs. The
federal recognition of Alaska tribes does not adhere to pre-defined
boundaries, but it does depend on a cohesiveness of a people that have
traditionally occupied a common geographic location. Tribes are not
recognized as loose political entities, but as, for example, the Native
Village of Minto, the Native Village of Tanana, the Akiak Native
Community, or Northway Village.352 There is a vital and necessary
connection between tribe and place. Even though the boundaries of a
Native village may not always exist in the form that one could track
down in a recorder’s office, tribal governments are almost invariably
associated with a particular village.353 This is especially true when one
considers that the geographic isolation of most Alaska villages places
practical, natural boundaries on the extent of the land that one could
reasonably be considered governed by a village and associated tribal
government.354 And because almost all villages in rural Alaska are
associated with a tribe, any Alaska Native living in rural Alaska should
and most certainly will know when they are within the reach of a tribe
and village. Because Congress has extended tribal court jurisdiction to
all American Indians and Alaska Natives, regardless of membership in
that particular tribe, tribal courts will have, at the very least, broad
criminal jurisdiction over any fellow Alaska Native living in or visiting
the village.355
Just as associating tribal jurisdiction with a village provides
sufficient geographic specificity for potential offenders to be on notice of
tribal criminal jurisdiction, there is also no reason to fear an over-

Court, 102 A.L.R. 5th 525 § 13[a] (2002).
352. See, e.g., Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 999 (Alaska 2014); State v.
Native Vill. of Tanana, 249 P.3d 734, 736 (Alaska 2011); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d
738, 743 (Alaska 1999).
353. But see CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 76, at 335 (noting that the Central
Council of the Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska covers multiple
villages). This tribe, though, is the exception that proves the rule.
354. One is tempted to think of Justice Potter Stewart’s famous aphorism
about pornography—you may not be able to define the village boundaries, but
you know them when you see them. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (giving the famous original line). While there may
be disputes about whether a particular offense occurred within the criminal
jurisdiction of a particular village, those disputes could be settled through a writ
of habeas corpus in state court.
355. As a policy matter, a tribe should also be permitted to prosecute
someone who attempts to ship banned substances (such as alcohol) to a village,
even though that person is doing so from outside the village. The extent to
which this action would establish the necessary minimum contacts, however,
would need to be resolved through litigation.
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extension of tribal criminal jurisdiction outside the general bounds of
the village. While Alaska courts are sometimes willing to entertain
domestic relations cases where the child at issue does not live in the
tribal village asserting jurisdiction, they still require the child to be a
member or eligible for membership in the tribe.356 Furthermore, there is
a fundamental difference between jurisdiction over domestic relations
and criminal jurisdiction. The former appropriately relies upon
membership in the tribe because the purpose is to protect the cultural
survival of the tribe.357 Even outside of an Indian law context,
jurisdiction over a custody action depends on jurisdiction over the
child.358 The latter, on the other hand, depends upon the locus of the
commission of an offending action. Consistent with commonly accepted
principles of criminal jurisdiction, tribes only have jurisdiction over
criminal actions that occur in the village over which the tribe has
authority, though enforcement jurisdiction could conceivably extend
beyond the village.359 Alaska tribes would have no more jurisdiction
over a tribal member who commits a crime outside of the village than
Alaska would over an Alaska resident who commits a crime in Texas.
This is consistent with the spirit of “minimum contacts” articulated in
John and other Alaska cases discussing personal jurisdiction in the sense
that limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction to offenses occurring in the
village is necessary to ensure a connection between the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation.360
Limited case law exists outside of Alaska regarding whether tribes
can exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed offreservation. This author was only able to find two opinions on this
issue.361 In both cases, tribes were denied the ability to prosecute tribal
members for alleged offenses committed outside of the tribe’s
reservation. However, in both cases the tribe had an existing reservation

356. See John, 982 P.2d at 764 (remanding for a determination under tribal law
of whether the child at issue was eligible for membership in the tribe).
357. Id. at 753.
358. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.300 (establishing initial child custody
jurisdiction in Alaska under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act).
359. For example, if a tribe issued a protective order and that order was
violated outside of the village, the tribe potentially could still be able to
criminally prosecute the violation of the protective order. Arguably, though, if
the protective order was registered with the State of Alaska, then enforcement
would rest with them.
360. In re Estate of Fields, 219 P.3d 995, 1009 (Alaska 2009).
361. Those opinions are Fife v. Moore, 808 F .Supp. 2d 1310 (E.D. Okla. 2011),
and Kelsey v. Pope, No. 1:09-CV-1015, 2014 WL 1338170 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 31,
2014), appeal docketed No. 14-1537 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 2014).
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that delimited its boundaries. Thus, there was an “on-reservation” with
which to contrast the “off-reservation.” In light of John, the basic
parameters of the village would constitute the area over which general
criminal jurisdiction could be exercised. The tribe is primarily concerned
with maintaining peace and order within the village, and actions within
will be the focus of its criminal proceedings.
3.

Banishment

Though a civil as opposed to criminal remedy, it is worth briefly
discussing banishment,362 as it touches upon many of the same issues as
personal jurisdiction. Namely, tribal banishment in Alaska would seek
to exclude an individual from a particular geographic area associated
with an Alaska Native tribe. Banishment is often a tool of last resort, but
can be used to exclude from a community individuals who pose a
continuing threat to health and safety.363 Indeed, while the tribal court in
the Native Village of Tanana initiated the process of banishing two men
for threats toward members of the tribal counsel after the tragic events
that resulted in the murder of two Alaska State Troopers,364 it is
conceivable that the tragedy could have been avoided in the first place
had banishment been a more available option beforehand.
Banishment is a well-established and commonly accepted remedy
for American Indian tribes in the Lower 48, at least with regard to tribes
with reservation land.365 The seminal case addressing banishment is
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians,366 which held that tribal court
orders permanently banishing members from a tribe’s reservation were
severe restrictions on liberty and the equivalent of a criminal sanction,
and therefore a suitable basis for habeas corpus relief in federal courts
under ICRA.367 Subsequent cases have emphasized the need for due
process protections, including the right to appeal within the tribal

362. For a more extensive overview of the law and legal history of
banishment, see Rob Roy Smith, Enhancing Tribal Sovereignty by Protecting Indian
Civil Rights: A Win-Win for Indian Tribes and Tribal Members, 2012 AM. INDIAN L.J.
(TRIAL ISSUE) 41, available at http://www.law.seattleu.edu/Documents/ailj/
trialissue/AILJTrialIssueWinter2012.pdf; Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as
Cultural Justice in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems, 37 N.M. L. REV. 85 (Winter
2007) [hereinafter Banishment]; Patrice H. Kunesh, Banishment as Cultural Justice
in Contemporary Tribal Legal Systems: A Postscript on Quair v. Sisco, 37 N.M. L.
REV. 479 (Spring 2007) [hereinafter Postscript].
363. Banishment, supra note 362, at 92.
364. Tanana Moves to Banish, supra note 57; Shedlock, supra note 57.
365. Smith, supra note 362, at 41–42; Banishment, supra note 362, at 107–08.
366. 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996).
367. Id. at 880.
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judicial system when a tribal member is sentenced to banishment, even
if the banishment is part of a larger decision to disenroll the tribal
member.368 However, when only tribal enrollment and not banishment
is at issue, there is no habeas right because there has been no detention
of the individual involved.369 In all of these cases—even in the ones
placing restrictions on the ability of the tribe to banish its members—
only the due process protections attendant to banishment have been
challenged, not the right of tribes to engage in banishment. Indeed, there
are no federal court decisions prohibiting tribes from engaging in
banishment from tribal territory.370
Though the Alaska Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
legality of banishment,371 the issue has arisen at the Superior Court level.
In 1999, the Native Village of Perryville IRA Council (“Perryville”)
passed a resolution banishing John Tague, a then-incarcerated tribal
member, because of threatening, aggressive, and assaultive conduct.372
The next year, Perryville filed for a permanent injunction against Tague,
which was granted in 2001 by a Superior Court in Anchorage.373 Tague
returned to Perryville in early 2003.374 When Perryville filed for and
obtained in 2003 a writ of assistance requiring that Alaska State
Troopers assist in removing Tague from the village, the State took the
step of writing a letter to the judge challenging the validity of the tribe’s
banishment order and consequently the writ of assistance.375 More
specifically, the State claimed that because Perryville did not possess
any Indian country, it could not assert its sovereignty through
banishment.376 The judge issued a show cause order requiring Perryville
to brief the issue and inviting response from Tague.377 Both Perryville
and the State extensively briefed the legality and enforceability of

368. Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 963, 971 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
369. Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2010).
370. There is even case law to suggest that a tribe can banish non-members
from its lands as part of the tribe’s inherent civil powers. E.g., Hardin v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1985).
371. Tribal banishment has, however, been mentioned in passing. E.g., Philip
J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 264 P.3d 842, 844 (Alaska 2011).
372. Native Village of Perryville IRA Council Res. 99-07 (1999) (on file with
author).
373. Native Vill. of Perryville v. Tague, No. 3AN-00-12245 CI (Alaska Super.
Ct. 2001) (on file with author).
374. Motion for Writ of Assistance, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-0012245 CI (2003) (on file with author).
375. Letter from Gregg D. Renkes, Att’y Gen., Alaska, to Peter Michalski,
Superior Court Judge, Alaska (Mar. 18, 2003) (on file with author).
376. Id. at 2.
377. Order to Show Cause, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-00-12245 CI
(2003) (on file with author).
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Perryville’s banishment order; Tague did not file a brief.378 Toward the
end of 2003, the court issued an order upholding the injunction.379 Part
of the reasoning in the order was that Tague was the true party in
interest, and because he had not challenged the injunction the court had
no basis to vacate it.380 However, the court also upheld the legality of the
injunction, though with mixed results for the tribe’s authority—the court
noted the “unfairness of subjecting an unwilling non-native citizen to
the authority of a native governing body is simply not allowed by the
authority claimed by Perryville,”381 but because Tague was a member of
the tribe and because he “had acted in demonstratively dangerous ways
to the people of Perryville,”382 the tribe was justified in issuing a
banishment order specific to the small village it occupied.383
The ruling in Native Village of Perryville v. Tague highlights the
complicated legal status of banishments. While the law clearly supports
banishment as an option to maintain order, treating banishment as a
civil remedy could potentially limit jurisdiction to tribal members. The
extension of jurisdiction over all Indians found in criminal cases would
not apply in civil cases. After all, there is no basis for believing that a
tribe in one village can decide a custody dispute for members of a tribe
at the other end of the state when the parents are not members and there
are no connections to that tribe. Three possible solutions arise to address
nonmember banishment. The first is to attempt to apply the Montana test
for extending civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. In Montana v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that tribes may regulate the activities of
non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land only where one of two
exceptions applied—either where (1) the non-Indian has entered into
378. Brief of Native Village of Perryville in Response to Order to Show
Cause, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-00-12245 CI (2003) (on file with author);
Brief for State of Alaska as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party in Response
to Order to Show Cause, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-00-12245 CI (2003) (on
file with author); Reply Brief of Native Village of Perryville in Response to Order
to Show Cause, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-00-12245 CI (2003) (on file with
author). A combined amicus brief was also filed by several residents of
Perryville, the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, the
Bristol Bay Native Association, and the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council. Brief of
Elizabeth Kosbruk et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Native Village of Perryville
in Response to Order to Show Cause, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-00-12245
CI (2003) (on file with author).
379. Order, Native Vill. of Perryville, No. 3AN-00-12245 CI (2003) (on file with
author).
380. Id. at 2–3.
381. Id. at 3. This language is arguably dicta.
382. Id, at 4.
383. Id. The court also placed weight in the fact that, although the
banishment order was ostensibly permanent, Tague was able to apply to lift the
ban every two years. Id. at 5.
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consensual relations with the tribe, such as through commercial
dealings, or (2) the activity of the non-Indian “threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.”384 However, it is not entirely clear
whether either of these exceptions would apply with regards to
banishment. Living in a village may not rise to the level of entering a
consensual relationship with the tribe. And while any actions that
would merit banishment would almost certainly threaten the “health or
welfare of the tribe,” the first part of this passage limits application to
fee lands within the tribe’s reservation.385 The second possible solution is
through application of the Violence Against Women Act,386 which
allows tribes “to exclude violators from Indian land” as part of its civil
jurisdiction.387 But this presents two problems: the Act’s restriction to
Indian country, which at this point does not exist for most tribes in
Alaska, and the Act’s application only to incidents of domestic violence.
The final solution is to consider banishment a criminal penalty rather
than a civil remedy. Such an interpretation is supported by Poodry,388
and given the analysis above would address many of the outstanding
jurisdiction issues. As a criminal offense, banishment would not be an
option for non-Indians, but the scope of jurisdiction might still be more
extensive than either of the two other proposed solutions.

CONCLUSION
Establishing criminal jurisdiction for Alaska tribes has been
recognized as a vital component of combatting the social ills that plague
rural Alaska Natives, especially considering the practical limitations
facing law enforcement and the Alaska Court System.389 But while these
reports and accompanying recommendations require intervening action
by third parties, such as an unlikely amendment of ANCSA by Congress
to extend Indian country status to ANCSA lands, tribal courts can
already assert criminal jurisdiction over Alaska Natives by virtue of
their inherent sovereignty, as a logical extension of the member-based

384. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
385. Id. at 566.
386. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4,
127 Stat. 54.
387. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(e).
388. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 888–89 (2d
Cir. 1996).
389. ILOC Roadmap, supra note 24, at ch.2, at 51–55; Att’y Gen.’s Advisory
Comm. on Am. Indian & Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence, supra
note 24, at 135–46.

ARTICLE 3 - FORTSON (DO NOT DELETE)

5/18/2015 2:05 PM

2015 ADVANCING TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION

151

jurisdiction recognized in John v. Baker. Alaska tribes can and should
undertake the steps needed to establish their own internal criminal
justice systems. The federal government has a trust responsibility to
provide funding for and assist in building tribal criminal justice systems.
And the State of Alaska would benefit in its law enforcement efforts in
rural Alaska by actively supporting tribal court criminal jurisdiction.
Tribal courts in Alaska are not lesser courts, but sovereign courts
that should be treated with respect.390 The Alaska Supreme Court
recently held that tribal court custody decisions are due the same respect
as judgments from another state.391 Indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court
has consistently upheld not only the sovereignty but also the
competency of tribal courts to decide internal affairs among their
members. In her State of the Judiciary speech to the Alaska Legislature
in 2013, Chief Justice Dana Fabe spoke eloquently of the central role that
tribal courts in Alaska can play in administering criminal justice in rural
Alaska:
Tribal courts bring not only local knowledge, cultural
sensitivity, and expertise to the table, but also valuable
resources, experience, and a high level of local trust. They exist
in at least half the villages of our state and stand ready, willing,
and able to take part in local justice delivery. Just as the three
branches of state government must work together closely to
ensure effective delivery of justice throughout the state court
system, state and tribal courts must work together closely to
ensure a system of rural justice delivery that responds to the
needs of every village in a manner that is timely, effective, and
fair. In short, we must all work together if we are to meet the
tremendous challenge of bush justice. To borrow the nautical
expression for rousing help in an emergency, the crisis in our
villages demands “all hands on deck.”
It is my hope that we can put behind us the days when
villagers express doubt and dissatisfaction with our delivery of
justice because it happens too far away from them. It is my
hope that we can put behind us the days when opportunities
390. See Evon Peter, Exec. Dir., Indigenous Leadership Institute, Testimony
before the Task Force on American Indian/Alaska Native Children Exposed to
Violence (June 11, 2014), quoted in Att’y Gen.’s Advisory Comm. on Am. Indian
& Alaska Native Children Exposed to Violence, supra note 24, at 132 (“The state
of Alaska needs a major shift in its policies and approaches to working with
Alaska Native tribes and people. We are not an enemy of the state. This is our
home and we love it. But we need to be respected and honored as equals.”).
391. See Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1011 (Alaska 2014) (holding that
tribal appellate remedies needed to be exhausted before a tribal court decision
could be challenged in Alaska state court).
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for mutual assistance, support, and coordination between state
and local authorities are lost because no clear lines of
communication or cooperation are in place. And it is my hope
that we can put behind us the days when minor village
problems become major ones because confusion over respective
roles means justice responses that are too little, too late.392
By being a local solution sensitive to the cultural traditions of the
community, tribal courts can play this vital role in delivering rural
justice. It is time for tribal courts in Alaska to be empowered to assert
their inherent sovereignty and jurisdiction over criminal offenses.

392. Dana Fabe, State of the Judiciary, ALASKA COURT SYS. 13 (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://courts.alaska.gov/soj/state13.pdf.

